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ABOUT THE CHILDREN
ACHIEVING CHALLENGE

EVALUATION OF
CHILDREN ACHIEVING

In February 1995, shortly after the School
Board of Philadelphia adopted Children
Achieving as a systemic reform agenda to
improve the Philadelphia public schools,
the Annenberg Foundation designated
Philadelphia as one of a few American
cities to receive a five-year $50 million
Annenberg Challenge grant to improve
public education.

In 1996, the Consortium for Policy Research
in Education (CPRE) at the University of
Pennsylvania and its partner, Research for
Action (RFA), were charged by the Children
Achieving Challenge with the evaluation of
Children Achieving. Between the 19951996 and 2000-2001 school years, CPRE
and RFA researchers interviewed hundreds
of teachers, principals, parents, students,
District officials, and civic leaders; sat in on
meetings where the plan was designed,
debated, and revised; observed its
implementation in classrooms and schools;
conducted two systemwide surveys of
teachers; and carried out independent
analyses of the District’s test results and
other indicators of system performance. An
outline of the research methods used by
CPRE and RFA is included in this report. A
listing of the reports on Children Achieving
currently available from CPRE is found
below. There will be one additional
summary report released in the coming
months. It will be available when it is
released on the CPRE web site at
www.cpre.org.

Among the conditions for receiving the
grant was a requirement to raise two
matching dollars ($100 million over five
years) for each one received from the
Annenberg Foundation and to create an
independent management structure to
provide program, fiscal, and evaluation
oversight of the grant. In Philadelphia, a
business organization, Greater Philadelphia
First, assumed this responsibility, and with
it, the challenge of building and sustaining
civic support for the improvement of public
education in the city.
Philadelphia’s Children Achieving was a
sweeping systemic reform initiative.
Systemic reform eschews a school-byschool approach to reform and relies on
coherent policy, improved coordination of
resources and services, content and
performance standards, decentralization of
decision-making, and accountability
mechanisms to transform entire school
systems. Led by a dynamic superintendent
and central office personnel, Children
Achieving was the first attempt by an urban
district to test systemic reform in practice.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
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CHILDREN ACHIEVING’S
THEORY OF ACTION

•

School Leadership and Reform: Case
Studies of Philadelphia Principals (May
2001)

To assess the progress and effects of a
comprehensive reform such as Children
Achieving, it is essential to understand its
“theory of action,” that is, the assumptions
made about what actions or behaviors will
produce the desired effects. A summary of
the Children Achieving theory of action
follows:

•

Contradictions and Control in Systemic
Reform: The Ascendancy of the Central
Office in Philadelphia Schools (August
2001)

•

Clients, Consumers, or Collaborators?
Parents and their Roles in School
Reform During Children Achieving,
1995-2000 (August 2001)

•

Powerful Ideas, Modest Gains: Five
Years of Systemic Reform in
Philadelphia Middle Schools (December
2001)

•

An Analysis of the Effect of Children
Achieving on Student Achievement in
Philadelphia Elementary Schools
(February 2002)

•

Civic Engagement and Urban School
Improvement: Hard-to-Learn Lessons
from Philadelphia (June 2002)

Given high academic standards and strong
incentives to focus their efforts and
resources; more control over school
resource allocations, organization, policies,
and programs; adequate funding and
resources; more hands-on leadership and
high-quality support; better coordination of
resources and programs; schools
restructured to support good teaching and
encourage improvement of practice; rich
professional development of their own
choosing; and increased public
understanding and support; the teachers
and administrators of the Philadelphia
schools will develop, adopt, or adapt
instructional technologies and patterns of
behavior that will help all children reach the
District’s high standards.

ADDITIONAL READING
ON CHILDREN
ACHIEVING
The following publications on the
evaluation of Children Achieving are
currently available through CPRE at (215)
573-0700, or email your requests to
cpre@gse.upenn.edu.
•

Recruiting and Retaining Teachers: Keys
to Improving the Philadelphia Public
Schools (May 2001)

AUTHORS’ NOTE
The research reported herein was
conducted by the Consortium for Policy
Research in Education and Research for
Action. Funding for this work was provided
by Greater Philadelphia First and the Pew
Charitable Trusts. Opinions expressed in
this report are those of the authors, and do
not necessarily reflect the views of Greater
Philadelphia First, the Pew Charitable
Trusts, or the institutional partners of
CPRE.
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CHILDREN ACHIEVING
EVALUATION 19952001: RESEARCH
METHODS
The Consortium for Policy Research in
Education and Research for Action used
the research methods indicated below in
their evaluation of the Children Achieving
Challenge.
1. 1996-2000 school-level data on
indicators that made up the District’s
Performance Responsibility Index
including student scores on the SAT-9,
student promotion and graduation
rates, student attendance, and teacher
attendance.
2. Two census surveys of teachers, the first
in 1997 and the second in 1999.
Teachers were asked about reform
implementation, school conditions, and
teaching practices. There was a greater
than 60 percent response rate on both
surveys.
3. School indicators describing teacher
and student characteristics in 1996 and
1999 obtained from the School District
of Philadelphia’s Information Services.
These data included school enrollment,
number of teachers, the proportion of
students qualifying for free or reducedprice lunch, among other indicators.
These data were used for descriptive
purposes and in hierarchical linear and
logistic regression models to help
understand the relationships among
reform implementation, student
outcomes, and school characteristics.
4. Five years (1995-1996 through 19992000) of qualitative research in 49
schools (26 elementary, 11 middle, and
12 high schools) in 14 clusters.

vii

Qualitative research included:
interviews of teachers, principals,
parents, outside partners who worked
in the schools, and in a few cases,
students; observations of classrooms,
small learning communities meetings,
professional development sessions, and
school leadership team meetings;
review of school documents (School
Improvement Plan, budget, etc.); and
intensive, multi-year case study
research in a subset of 25 schools (13
elementary, 5 middle, and 7 high
schools).
5. Interviews of central office and cluster
staff and observations of meetings and
other events.
6. Interviews of 40 Philadelphia civic
leaders (including political leaders,
leaders in the funding community,
public education advocates, journalists,
and business leaders).
In addition, numerous other studies
conducted during Children Achieving
informed this evaluation. These included:
Bruce Wilson and Dick Corbett’s three-year
interview study of middle school students;
an evaluation of the Philadelphia Urban
Systemic Initiative in Mathematics and
Science conducted by Research for Action;
the Philadelphia Education Longitudinal
Study conducted by Frank Furstenberg at
the University of Pennsylvania; and the
evaluation of the William Penn
Foundation’s initiative in two clusters,
conducted by the National Center for
Restructuring Education, Schools, and
Teaching.
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INTRODUCTION

I

n 1994, David Hornbeck came to
Philadelphia with a bold plan to do
what “no city with any significant
number and diversity of students” had
ever done before: help “a large
proportion of its young people achieve at
1
high levels.” Trained as an attorney and
minister, Hornbeck had served as
Commissioner of education in Maryland
and had been one of the architects of
Kentucky’s Education Reform Act, a
standards-based reform effort that coupled
school-level accountability with significant
increases in funding for public education.
Philadelphia’s corporate and civic leaders
and its Democratic mayor, Ed Rendell,
were impressed with Hornbeck’s
credentials and saw standards and
accountability as a potentially winning
formula for Philadelphia’s poorly
performing schools. They looked to him to
turn the system around.
Shortly after the Philadelphia School Board
adopted Hornbeck’s Children Achieving
reform program, the Annenberg
Foundation designated Philadelphia as one
of three American cities to receive a fiveyear $50 million Annenberg Challenge
2
grant. (See Sidebar 1 at the end of this
section for a timeline of the Children
Achieving initiative.) The stars seemed
aligned for real educational improvement.
One local foundation staff member
expressed the prevailing view: “We believe
that if not now in Philadelphia, then
3
when?”

1

School District of Philadelphia, Children Achieving
strategic action design. Philadelphia: Author, 1995,
p. i.
2

For a further discussion of the role of the Children
Achieving Challenge and Greater Philadelphia First in
Children Achieving, see the section entitled,
“Children Achieving: A Calculated Risk.”
3

Foundation staff, 1996.

1

But in June 2000, in the face of a huge
budget deficit, declining support from
newly-elected Mayor John Street, and the
threat of a state takeover, Superintendent
Hornbeck resigned, rather than oversee the
dismantling of his vision for a system in
which all children would achieve at high
levels. Within a year, Pennsylvania
contracted with Edison Schools, the largest
for-profit provider of educational services
in the country, to review the District and
provide recommendations for a major
overhaul of the city’s public schools. By
December 2001, the Governor and Mayor
Street agreed to terms for the state to take
direct control over Philadelphia’s public
school system — a move originally
contested by Mayor Street. Under the
“friendly” takeover, a five-member School
Reform Commission (SRC) — three
members appointed by the Governor and
two by the Mayor — replaced the Board of
Education. The SRC quickly took the
unprecedented step of requesting
proposals from private firms, institutions,
and community organizations to perform a
sweeping array of central office functions.
At the time that this report went to press,
Edison Schools had assumed the role of
“senior management consultant” and the
SRC had chosen a variety of sponsoring
organizations, including national for-profit
education management organizations and
community groups, to run 70 of the
District’s lowest performing schools.
Ironically, although Children Achieving was
publicly discredited by local and state
leaders, the reform had made headway
during its six years of implementation.
Elementary school students showed
significant improvement on the SAT-9 test
(the Stanford Achievement Test-Ninth
Edition), the District’s standardized test
measure. And public education had
become a front-page story in a city where
there had been apathy and little discussion.
Public reporting of school-by-school test
data and data disaggregated by
race/ethnicity and income level had set the

2
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stage for educators to be held accountable
for results. Community organizing and a
public information campaign had
encouraged greater public engagement. In
fact, some believed that the District’s
progress during Children Achieving had
been remarkable and were incredulous that
there was not broader acknowledgment of
Philadelphia’s achievements:
Philadelphia made a remarkable amount of
progress masked by political turmoil in the
District, city, and state. And it made
progress even with union opposition, with
a split board against David, and with critics
of David at the city and state levels.
Philadelphia launched an almost decadelong effort to restructure its schools into
smaller communities. There were
demonstrable results in improvements on
the accountability index. Attendance
increased, showing greater student
engagement. There was an increase in
performance at lower levels of progress —
with the students below basic and basic.
The creation of organizations like the
Alliance Organizing Project shows
progress. And along with that, efforts to
develop standards at the local level
demonstrated progress. Teachers were
also given the tools to put standards into
4
practice with curriculum frameworks.
Why were the District’s accomplishments
not more widely recognized? What was it
about the vision, strategies, and style of
reform leaders; the reform plan and its
implementation; the views and actions of
government, business, and civic leaders;
and the larger economic and political
context that produced a shift toward a
radically different model of school reform?
In this report, we examine how reform
leaders — faced with the daunting task of
improving student achievement while the
dollars available for public education were
4

Civic leader, October 2000.

actually shrinking — tried to build the
public support necessary to convince
lawmakers that an increase in spending
would be a sound investment. We tell the
story from the perspectives of Philadelphia
civic elites. Interviews with more than 40 of
Philadelphia’s leaders from government,
business, civic organizations, higher
education, the media, and the School
District during the period January 2000January 2001 serve as the basis for our
account. (See Appendix A for a discussion
of our research methods.)
From its inception, Children Achieving was
a calculated risk by District leaders who
believed that they could effect sufficient
gains in student achievement to convince
the public and political leaders to increase
the dollar investment in the city’s schools.
Initially, the Children Achieving reform plan
was championed by key sectors of the
community — the business and foundation
communities, civic leaders, and the mayor.
However, a deeper reading of the interview
transcripts revealed that, in fact, our
informants had varying and sometimes
competing interpretations of the reform’s
major ideas and how those ideas would
work together to effect improvement in
schools and student achievement. Our
research shows how difficult it is to create
resilient civic coalitions that persist in the
face of the harsh circumstances of
inadequate funding. It signals the problems
that arise for reform leaders as they try to
communicate easily-understood messages
about complex ideas like standards,
accountability, and decentralization and as
they report student progress on leading
achievement indicators within a context of
very low absolute performance.

WHY THIS REPORT IS
IMPORTANT NOW
A premise of Ambassador Annenberg’s
unprecedented gift to American public
education was that “something should be
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done to improve [public schools] and that
5
something could be done,” and that a
city’s leaders and citizens were key to the
success of its schools.
Schools would improve only when
communities realized it was in their own
best interests to take the tough political
steps necessary to provide a good
education for every child. They would
improve when private citizens and
institutions became willing to invest
substantial amounts of time, energy, and
money in public education — not just for
their own children, but for “other people’s”
children as well. Annenberg hoped his own
financial commitment would galvanize this
nationwide effort in localities around the
country, with his dollars matching new ones
6
that local planners would raise.
The Annenberg Challenge’s emphasis on
civic engagement was well justified to
many who have studied urban school
reform and analyzed its failures in cities
such as Atlanta, Baltimore, Chicago, San
Antonio, San Francisco, and Seattle. These
educational policy analysts argue that deep
and enduring reform requires more than a
strong leader with a plausible plan. Leaders
of a city’s important institutions and
grassroots groups must offer critical
support. Additionally, educational theorists
currently argue that reformers must be
flexible in their development of reform
approaches. They believe that no single
approach to educational reform offers a
sufficiently robust strategy to turn failing
7
urban school districts around.

Public schools in Philadelphia are about to
enter into a new educational experiment,
one that puts school governance in the
hands of the state and involves private
enterprise and community groups on an
unprecedented scale in the running of
central office functions and the operation
of schools. Is civic engagement in public
schools even relevant under these
circumstances? Historians and political
scientists who have researched this
question would argue, “Yes.” In their study
of civic engagement in public schools in 11
cities, Clarence Stone and his colleagues
found that educational improvement
faltered when there was low civic capacity
8
for reforming schools. In two of the cities
studied, schools were governed by court
order as a result of desegregation cases. In
both cases, public engagement was low in
part because citizens considered the
schools to be the domain of the courts. Will
Philadelphians and others sit back and
relegate improvement of the city’s schools
to the School Reform Commission? To
date, state takeovers of urban districts have
proved moderately successful at
ameliorating financial crises and cleaning
up graft. Thus far, they have not succeeded
in improving educational programs and
9
raising student achievement.
It is likely that the public will remains a
crucial factor in reform’s success — no
matter what the governance structure. The
past offers some lessons about how to
accomplish this. This report offers the
larger public a framework for evaluating
what the new players in Philadelphia
schools propose and undertake. (We
believe the framework is also useful to

5

B. Cervone and J. McDonald, Preliminary reflections
on the Annenberg Challenge: A working paper
drawn from its first projects. Providence, RI:
Annenberg Challenge, 1999, p. 1.
6

8

C. Stone, Civic capacity and urban education.
Unpublished manuscript, 2001, available at
http://www.bsos.umd.edu/gupt/stone/prob.html.

Ibid, p. 4.
9

7

P. Hill, J. Harvey, and C. Campbell, It takes a city:
Getting serious about urban school reform.
Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2000.

3

K. Wong and P. Jain, “City and state takeover as a
school reform strategy.” Paper presented at the
annual meeting of the Association for Public Policy
Analysis and Management, Seattle, WA, November
2000.

4
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citizens in other cities.) During the coming
months, a variety of strategies for
improving schools will emerge. Each of
these proposed reforms is, in fact, a theory
of action about how to improve education.
Schon and Argyris elaborated and used the
concept of theory of action in their work on
10
the organizational change process. A
theory of action is the assumptions and
beliefs that leaders hold about how change
will occur; in the case of educational
reform, how reform components will effect
the desired improvements in schools,
classrooms, and students.
In this report, we discuss the theory of
action underlying Children Achieving at
length. We also identify other theories
about how to raise student achievement
that emerged in our interviews with city
leaders. We do this so as to make these
various approaches explicit. In order for
citizens to assess the potential of proposed
reforms and the success of enacted ones, it
is important that they understand
reformers’ assumptions about the causal
links between a reform’s design, its
activities, and its goals. It is important to
ask such questions as: What do reformers
believe about how their proposals will
effect improvement? Are their assumptions
logical? Are the proposals robust and
strategic? Are their theories of action
based on past experience, empirical
evidence, or ideology? And questions
about the values underlying reform
proposals and their attention to issues of
social justice and equity are extremely
important in a city where more than 80
percent of students are children of color
who live in poverty. Whose interests are
being served by proposed approaches to
reform? In short, it is important to
understand and question the theories of
action underlying the changes proposed by
10

C. Argyris and D.A. Schon, Theory in practice:
Increasing professional effectiveness. San Francisco:
Jossey-Bass, 1974.

reformers so that the public can protect the
interests of the community’s children and
increase the likelihood that they will benefit
from the proposed reforms.

ORGANIZATION OF THE
REPORT
We begin with a description of Philadelphia
and its schools at the time of
Superintendent Hornbeck’s arrival. What
was the educational situation prior to
Children Achieving? What were the
existing relationships between the District
and key sectors of the city, including
business, government, and civic
organizations? We also discuss our
informants’ varying perspectives on the
challenges that confronted the city. Their
different views on Philadelphia’s problems
and their relationship to public education
set the stage for differing assessments of
Children Achieving’s success.
Children Achieving was an ambitious and
comprehensive reform plan. We outline the
plan and discuss how its elements were
intended to work together to improve
schools and student achievement. In order
to understand civic leaders’ assessments of
Children Achieving’s impact, it is important
to know how they interpreted its
foundational ideas and key components.
How did various groups make sense of the
plan articulated by District leaders? How
did they think it was supposed to work?
We then detail six strategies of District
leaders to build public support for the
reforms. We reveal the effects of District
leaders’ steps and missteps as they sought
to gain more funding for schools and the
larger contextual factors that constrained
their visions and strategies. There were
significant accomplishments during
Children Achieving and there are important
lessons from its disappointments. Finally,
we summarize these from the perspectives
of our interviewees in order to define
common ground for moving forward.
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SIDEBAR 1. CHILDREN ACHIEVING TIMELINE

August 1994
•
•

David Hornbeck appointed Superintendent of Philadelphia schools.
Philadelphia Federation of Teachers contract settled.

October 1994
•

Philadelphia Inquirer publishes “District in Distress,” its first report card on the state of
Philadelphia public schools, including information on poverty rates, dropout rates, teachers’
salaries, and student performance on the SAT-9.

November 1994
•
•
•

Tom Ridge (R) elected Governor of Pennsylvania.
Mayor Ed Rendell (D) re-elected.
As part of a desegregation case against the District, Judge Doris Smith orders the School
District to submit a plan for reducing racial disparities in student achievement. This comes
after an education panel’s findings paint a dismal portrait of the Philadelphia school system,
citing “an overall attitude of helplessness and resignation” about several aspects of the
District among school staff and from citizens.

February 1995
•
•

Children Achieving Action Design published.
Philadelphia receives a $50 million Annenberg Challenge grant, which is matched by $100
million from Philadelphia corporations, foundations, and federal grants. Greater
Philadelphia First (GPF) announced as administration site for grant, the Children Achieving
Challenge, and Vicki Phillips is named Executive Director of the Challenge.

May 1995
•

Five months after taking office, Governor Ridge proposes a statewide voucher plan, which
would provide families throughout Pennsylvania with school vouchers that could be used at
private, religious, or out-of-district public schools. This is the first of Ridge’s three pushes to
establish a statewide voucher program, none of which were able to garner needed
legislative support.

September 1995
•
•

First six clusters formally established.
City Council President John Street criticizes the Children Achieving agenda for being too
complicated.

December 1995
•

Standards Writing Teams, composed of parents, teachers, and community members, are
convened; writing of new academic standards begins.

5

6
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SIDEBAR 1. CHILDREN ACHIEVING TIMELINE (CONTINUED)

February 1996
•

Philadelphia Daily News publishes a series of opinion columns that criticize Superintendent
Hornbeck and Children Achieving. They kick off a series of articles and opinion pieces
called, “The Great School Debate.”

August 1996
•

Standards distributed to teachers for review.

September 1996
•
•

All 22 clusters established.
Family Resource Network established to provide support to families.

January 1997
•

State Representative Dwight Evans announces legislative proposals to write certain aspects
of Philadelphia’s education reforms into law.

February 1997
•

•

•

•

Hornbeck announces plan to reconstitute Olney and Audenried High Schools, drawing
harsh criticism from school staff. The plan is abandoned when an external mediator judges
the process invalid.
Mayor Rendell, City Council President Street, Superintendent Hornbeck, School Board
members, and community leaders issue, Realities Converge: This Year is Different. The
report details the origins of the District’s fiscal crisis and its future plans for managing the
deficit. The authors promised a zero-growth School District budget but “drew a line in the
sand” and refused to cut any more school-based programs.
District, city, and community leaders file lawsuit against the state contending that
Pennsylvania does not provide a “thorough and efficient” education. Case later dismissed
by state Supreme Court, which ruled that school funding decisions must be made by the
legislature, not the courts.
City Council President John Street, then a candidate for mayor, makes his first public foray
into working with the public on the issue of education by convening the Philadelphia
Education Summit. The Summit aimed to stimulate a broad discourse on public education
issues through televised forums, focus groups, town meetings, and a major conference.

September 1997
•

Professional Responsibility Index (PRI) scores made public for the first time. The PRI, which
had been adopted the previous year by the Board of Education, is intended to provide each
school with a sense of where it stands along several dimensions, including: standardized
tests, student and teacher attendance, and promotion and dropout rates. This marks the
first reporting period of the first two-year accountability cycle (measuring progress from
1996-1998). Much of the data released at this time are made public for the first time in the
District’s history. A number of schools show low progress.
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SIDEBAR 1. CHILDREN ACHIEVING TIMELINE (CONTINUED)

January 1998
•
•

Graduation and promotion requirements identified.
Vicki Phillips resigns as Executive Director of the Children Achieving Challenge. Suzanne
Becker replaces her.

February 1998
•

Hornbeck threatens to adopt an unbalanced budget if the state does not provide needed
funds, which could lead to the schools closing before the end of the school year.

March 1998
•

The District, city, and other officials and interest groups file a federal civil-rights suit against
the state, known as Powell v. Ridge. The plaintiffs contend that the state’s funding practices
discriminate against school districts with large numbers of non-White students.

April 1998
•

State legislature responds by passing Act 46, a draconian state takeover law aimed
specifically at Philadelphia.

March 1999
•

Members of GPF’s board stand behind Governor Ridge when he introduces his second
statewide voucher proposal, designed to provide vouchers to students in the most
academically troubled school districts throughout Pennsylvania. Again, he lacks the
legislative support needed to pass the proposal.

November 1999
•

Street is elected Mayor. His role in public education is expanded during this election when
Philadelphians pass a referendum to change the City Charter to allow the Mayor to appoint
all members of the School Board with terms concurrent to his own.

January 2000
•

Street appoints new educational leadership in Philadelphia. He selects a new School Board,
the first time this has happened in the history of Philadelphia. He retains several, but not all,
members of the previous Board. Street also appoints the first Secretary of Education for the
city, Debra Kahn, who is charged with leading the District’s team in negotiation of a new
teachers’ contract.

March 2000
•

Mayor Street holds community meetings about education issues in all 22 clusters. At
meetings, he solicits input about the schools and warns community members of a looming
fiscal crisis, asking that they demand an adequately funded school system from elected
officials at the state level.
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SIDEBAR 1. CHILDREN ACHIEVING TIMELINE (CONTINUED)

May 2000
•

The Pennsylvania Legislature passes and Governor Ridge signs the Education
Empowerment Act, a state reform and “takeover” bill targeted at 11 school districts
(including Philadelphia) with high student failure rates.

June 2000
•

•
•

Threat of state takeover crisis in the District during the Republican Convention in
Philadelphia is averted by a financial settlement between the District and Governor Ridge.
Still facing a deficit, the School Board cuts the budget and Hornbeck resigns in protest.
School District announces number of teaching vacancies.
School Board adopts a FY2001 budget with an amount deficit.

August 2000
•

•

Teacher contract expires, beginning two months of tense negotiating between the union
and the Board of Education. Teachers authorize a strike, but continue to work with the
knowledge that the District could impose new terms of employment at any point. Shortly
thereafter, the Board of Education does impose new terms and conditions of employment.
The union strikes over a weekend. The contract is settled before school is disrupted with
the intervention of Mayor Street and pressure from Governor Ridge, who threatens a state
takeover.
Board of Education announces decision to adopt a corporate style of management. Deidre
Farmbry, a veteran Philadelphia educator, appointed Chief Academic Officer.

October 2000
•

Philip Goldsmith, a lawyer and journalist, appointed interim Chief Executive Officer of
District.

January 2001
•

Education Week gives Pennsylvania a grade of “D-“ on funding equity in comparison to
other states. It is followed by only seven other states.

May 2001
•

•

Governor Ridge succeeds in passing an education plan that exchanges an increase in
teacher pensions for a package of education bills that many observers perceive as a
backdoor to vouchers. The package includes bills that provide state tax credits of up to 90
percent to corporations for donations to groups that finance scholarships to private schools
or public schools outside of students’ home districts.
As an economy measure, the District’s 22 clusters are replaced by eight academic offices,
reducing administrative costs and reassigning some cluster staff to teaching positions. At
month’s end, the School Board adopts a budget with a $216 million deficit, creating a new
fiscal crisis with state takeover of the District possible.
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SIDEBAR 1. CHILDREN ACHIEVING TIMELINE (CONTINUED)

July 2001
•

Mayor Street and Governor Ridge sign a Memorandum of Understanding giving the
Governor permission to commission an analysis of the financial and educational state of the
District. Ridge hires Edison Schools to do the job.

October 2001
•
•
•

In the aftermath of September’s terrorist attacks, President Bush appoints Governor Ridge
to U.S. Office of Homeland Security. Lt. Governor Mark Schweiker replaces him.
Governor Schweiker passes stealth amendment to Act 46, the state takeover law. It gives
the state increased power over the governance body outlined in the act.
Schweiker releases his proposal for the District, based heavily on Edison’s analysis of the
District. It includes plans to have a private education management organization (presumably
Edison Schools) run the central administration and to have Edison run at least 45 schools.
The Mayor and Governor have a month to negotiate a deal or the state has authority to
take over the District.

November 2001
•

Governor Schweiker backs off of his proposal to have Edison run the District’s central
administration, but keeps them in a consulting role to the central office and as a private
manager of schools.
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PHILADELPHIA AND ITS
SCHOOLS
THE CITY

T

he 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s were
disastrous years for Philadelphia.
When David Hornbeck began his
tenure as Superintendent, the city
was recovering from a serious fiscal
crisis during which it was forced to borrow
$150 million from its employee pension
fund just to stay afloat. With its credit
ruined, the city had to pay more than $5
million to obtain the loan, a fee equivalent
11
to a 24 percent interest rate. From a peak
of 2.1 million in the 1950s, population had
dropped precipitously to the current level
12
of 1.4 million. The city lost 80 percent of
its manufacturing jobs, and the total
number of jobs dropped from a high of
800,000 to 250,000 during the same
period. These trends have slowed, but still
13
continue. And the economy of the greater
Philadelphia region, while not as bleak as
the city’s, is certainly sluggish in
comparison to many other large
metropolitan areas which experienced
14
strong growth during the 1990s.
Philadelphia citizens and corporations bear
one of the highest tax burdens in the
country. City residents pay a wage tax just
below five percent and most city leaders
attribute the city’s loss of jobs as well as
population largely to the wage tax. For
their part, corporations pay a business
privilege tax that taxes both the net
11

M. de Courcy Hinds, “A $150 million loan buys
Philadelphia some time,” The New York Times (1991,
January 6), p. 14.
12

Metropolitan Philadelphia Policy Center, Flight (or)
fight: Metropolitan Philadelphia and its future.
Philadelphia: Author, 2001.

13

Ibid.

14

Ibid.

11

income of a business and its gross receipts.
(This means that the city is taxing a
business whether it shows a profit or not.)
In 1998, Philadelphia was judged as having
the highest business tax burden in the
15
country. One reason for this devastating
tax burden is that the city is co-terminus
with the county which means that residents
must bear the full weight of paying for
county as well as city services. A second
reason is that the Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania is a “low tax state” and its aid
to cities is also low. The taxing dilemma has
been termed the Gordian Knot, “not
amenable to unraveling even with the best
16
of intentions and considerable resources.”
During his eight-year tenure, which began
in 1992, Mayor Ed Rendell brought
Philadelphia back from financial collapse,
creating a small budget surplus before he
17
left office in 2000. His tough stance
during a strike of city workers early in his
administration won accolades from the
business community, as the city ultimately
negotiated more discretion for
management. Democrat Rendell worked
with Republican state officials to bring jobs
to Philadelphia, and by 1997 the local
economy showed a mild upswing, with a

15

B.J. Whiting, Philadelphia: Prospects and
challenges at the end of the decade. (Report to the
Pew Charitable Trusts, 1999.)
16

17

Ibid, p. 29.

The Mayor even succeeded in making
Philadelphians proud of their city again. (This was no
easy feat, given the image Philadelphia conjured up
for many Americans — an entire city block in flames
after Mayor Wilson Goode and his managing director
dropped a bomb on the headquarters of the radical
group MOVE.) Putting tourism at the center of
Philadelphia’s economic renewal, Rendell
flamboyantly promoted “the city that loves you
back.” Perhaps the city and Rendell’s greatest
accomplishment, at least symbolically, was attracting
the Republican National Convention — an irony
given that by the time of the convention, in August
2000, Rendell, no longer mayor, was the Democratic
National Committee Chair.
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net gain in jobs that reversed a trend of
18
several decades.
However, the financial picture of the
Philadelphia School District worsened
during this period because the state froze
its formula for providing funds to local
districts in 1993. The formula takes into
account the number of pupils, the special
needs of the District, its ability to raise local
taxes, and other factors. After 1993, state
aid to the District no longer rose in
response to increases in enrollment. On a
per-pupil basis adjusted for inflation, the
real value of state education funds coming
to Philadelphia actually decreased by 5.9
19
percent between 1993 and 1998.
During Children Achieving, the School
District’s per-pupil spending was well
below what was being spent by districts in
surrounding counties, by as much as $5,443
20
per student. Teacher salaries were also
higher in suburban schools. Average
starting salaries in the suburbs were over
$3,500 higher than starting salaries in
Philadelphia and maximum salaries were
21
over $9,000 higher.
Philadelphia’s Board of Education had the
responsibility for setting policy and
spending priorities, but it had no taxing
22
power. City Council levies taxes. Under

these circumstances, it’s not surprising that
when Superintendent Hornbeck went to
the Mayor and City Council for increased
funding for schools, they were resistant.
Neither was willing to risk the financial
jeopardy or political heat that increased
city taxes to fund the schools would
generate. Their response was that the city
had “stretched its taxing ability to the
limit” and they refused to provide
significant additional resources for Children
23
Achieving. By 1997, the Superintendent,
the Board of Education, the City Council,
and the Mayor were all looking to the state
to solve the District’s fiscal problems. They
were in agreement that the state was
failing to provide a fair share of the costs of
educating Philadelphia’s students.

THE SCHOOLS
Superintendent Hornbeck inherited a
stable, but poorly performing school
system. Unlike some other American cities
where graft and patronage have made
public schooling a disreputable enterprise,
the District was seen as honest, but failing.
A special section of the Philadelphia
Inquirer published in 1994 — the summer
of Hornbeck’s arrival — painted a dismal
portrait of student achievement in the city’s
schools. According to the Inquirer:
•

18

N. Lemann, “No man’s town: The good times are
killing off America’s local elites.” The New Yorker
(2000, June 5), pp. 22-28.
19

J. Century, A citizen’s guide to the Philadelphia
school budget. Philadelphia: Greater Philadelphia
First, 1998.

20

School District of Philadelphia, Realities converge,
revisited: School district sees gains on test scores
and management efficiencies, but fiscal crisis is at
hand. Philadelphia: Author, 1998, p. 11.
21

22

Ibid, p. 29.

Until January 2001, the Mayor was not able to
appoint the entire Board when he assumed office,
which diluted the accountability of the Board to the
Mayor. But in the November 2000 election,

Over half of the city’s public school
students were failing to master basic
skills. Fifty-one percent failed the state
reading test as compared to 13 percent
statewide, and 50 percent failed the
state math test as compared to 14
percent statewide. Seventy percent of
African Americans and 75 percent of
Latinos failed one or both parts of the
state test.

Philadelphia citizens voted to change the city charter
so that the Mayor would have the authority to
appoint all Board members at one time and to
remove Board members at his/her discretion.
23

School District of Philadelphia, Realities converge,
revisited, p. 11.
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•

Forty-nine percent of ninth-graders
failed to earn promotion to the tenth
grade.

•

On any given day, one in four students
was absent from class, and in the
average year, nearly one in four
24
students was suspended from school.

Corporate and civic leaders were
disappointed in student performance and
disillusioned with local District leadership.
Constance Clayton had served as the first
African American and first female
superintendent from 1980 to 1992. When
Clayton assumed the District helm, she
faced a system deeply wounded by bitter
union strikes and in financial crisis. She
made labor peace and financial stability the
first order of business in her plan to
improve public education, and to her
credit, was successful in these areas.
Clayton’s education reforms included a
Standardized Curriculum that offered an
academic scope and sequence for all
grades and subject areas. A citywide
testing program aligned test items with
discrete curriculum objectives and
provided schools with a tool to monitor
student progress toward achievement
goals specified in their School
Improvement Plan. Unfortunately, her
strategy for improving the academic
achievement of students produced
disappointing results.
Under Clayton, the private sector increased
its investment in public education. Higher
education, foundations, and private sector
partners created PATHS/PRISM, the
precursor to the Philadelphia Education
Fund, which aimed to professionalize
teaching through professional
development activities and mini-grants for
classroom teachers. Philadelphia was
nationally known for its strong teacher

networks, including the Philadelphia
Writing Project, the Math Congress, and
the Teachers’ Learning Cooperative, that
25
had been nurtured by PATHS/PRISM.
In 1986, the Pew Charitable Trusts made a
groundbreaking $13 million grant to
establish the Philadelphia Schools
Collaborative, which aimed to radically
restructure Philadelphia’s neighborhood
high schools. The Collaborative crafted a
strategy that restructured large, alienating
high schools into campuses of small
learning communities. It also pressed the
District to pursue new school governance
structures, including site-based councils
and “experimental status” which allowed
exemptions from labor and state
regulations in schools in which 75 percent
of staff voted to adopt innovations. But
both PATHS/PRISM and the Collaborative
brushed up against District bureaucracy
and the Philadelphia Federation of
Teachers in the bid to gain autonomy for
the new small learning communities. For
civic leaders, particularly foundation staff,
these contentious public encounters
highlighted the system’s resistance to
change and the barriers to reform posed
by the teachers’ contract.
Civic elites believed that Clayton had
sought their support, but not their input on
matters of substance. They were
disillusioned with a District administration
that was not forthcoming with data on
whether students were actually making
26
progress. City and civic leaders seized
Clayton’s retirement as the moment to
influence the direction of Philadelphia
public education. They established the
Partnership for Public Education, which
worked with the Mayor and Board of
Education to recruit a superintendent who
25

E. Useem, J. Culbertson, and J. Buchanan, The
contributions of teacher networks to Philadelphia’s
school reform. Philadelphia: Philadelphia Education
Fund, 1997.

24

“A district in distress,” Philadelphia Inquirer (1994,
October 23).

13

26

Business leader, October 2000.
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would put accountability for results at the
center of the District reform agenda. By
this time, the Pew Charitable Trusts had
assumed a prominent role in the national
standards movement and staff there hoped
to recruit a leader committed to that brand
of reform.

CIVIC INFRASTRUCTURE AND
COMMUNITY GROUPS
A study of Philadelphia’s prospects and
challenges commissioned by the Pew
Charitable Trusts in the 1990s
characterized the city’s civic leadership as
“disengaged” and as having a “pervasive,
27
defeatist mentality.” Despite Mayor Ed
Rendell’s cheerleading for city
improvements, civic institutions and leaders
did not develop a “can do” spirit and
efforts at rallying together to solve a
particular issue were limited. Community
development corporations were weak
when Superintendent Hornbeck arrived
and, while there were a few examples of
effective neighborhood and grassroots
organizing, they remained isolated and
were not directed at public education.

PERCEPTIONS OF THE
SCHOOLS
The vulnerability of the city’s small
economic gains during the 1990s was
prominent in our interviews. In response to
the question, “What do you view as the
three greatest challenges to
Philadelphia?”, informants almost
universally named economic decline and a
desperately inadequate public school
system. Our respondents saw the state of
the schools and the state of the city,
especially the city’s economy, as tightly
linked, but they presented varying views on
the lines of causality. Respondents also

focused on different consequences of the
school system’s inadequacies.
All of the people with whom we spoke
expressed grave concerns about the city’s
economic viability. Many implicated the
schools in the city’s decline. Some blamed
schools for the flight of the middle class
and the ensuing erosion of the tax base:
Public education is central to improving the
city. The issues that we hear about from
the neighborhoods are safety and schools.
Schools are the biggest reason that people
28
leave the city. Myself included.
The poor quality of education is certainly at
the top of my list. And then there are the
consequences from that — the loss of an
employment base, the high tax structure
compared to the suburbs, and the fact that
29
people don’t want to stay in the city.
Others criticized schools for churning out
students who were not prepared for
employment. They saw the school system
as responsible for a poorly educated
workforce that discouraged corporations
from remaining in Philadelphia or choosing
to locate here:
I’ve been involved in trying to get big
technology to the city. And it’s not
happening. The wage tax is not the
deciding factor. Workforce preparedness is
the biggest concern. And these folks are
not looking for high-end employees. These
are basic, entry-level jobs. They just want
people who will be responsible, stick
30
around, and learn something.
Prospective employers are concerned with
31
the lack of talent in the city.
28

Media leader, April 2000.

29

Civic leader, March 2000.

30

Media leader, April 2000.

31

Civic leader, January 2001.

27

Whiting, Philadelphia: Prospects and challenges at
the end of the decade, p. 22.
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In summary, these interviewees stressed
the need to attract and hold businesses if
the city was going to establish a viable tax
base. From their viewpoint, Philadelphia’s
economic recovery hinged on the schools’
capacity to produce an adequate workforce
and attract middle- and working-class
families. More and better jobs would
encourage middle- and working-class
families to live in and contribute to the
city’s prosperity through their taxes,
consumer spending, and housing
investments. But the city could compete for
these new residents only if there were
good public schools for their children.
It is only a small overstatement to say that
these interviewees laid Philadelphia’s
decline at the feet of its school system. Is
this a fair analysis? We have already noted
the negative impact of high taxes on
working- and middle-class residents. In
addition, while it is true that many of the
middle-class Philadelphia residents recently
relocated city cite poor public schools as a
factor in their decision to leave, the trend
of suburbanization began in the early
twentieth century as result of federal
housing and highway policies,
discriminatory bank lending for housing,
and flight from the influx of poor
32
immigrants. Further, it is impossible to
talk about suburbanization without
situating it within a history of race relations
in the U.S. At times explicitly, and always
implicitly, the suburbs have been identified
as a place for White families.
Grassroots civic leaders and School Board
members painted a more complex picture
32

K. Jackson, Crabgrass frontier: The suburbanization
of the United States. New York: Oxford University
Press, 1985. In his analysis of federal housing policies
over the past century, Jackson asserts that federal
housing policies, the development of the modern
transportation system, and the relocation of major
corporate centers from urban to suburban areas have
been the real culprits. He concludes that the basic
direction of federal policies toward housing has been
concentration of the poor in the central city and the
dispersal of the affluent to the suburbs.
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of the relationship between public schools
and the city economy. They saw the two in
a cruel and mutually reinforcing dynamic.
Often they focused on the city’s existing
residents and the lack of economic
opportunities for them:
We’re in a vicious cycle. We have a
declining tax base, so the city is less able to
provide the services people expect, so
people leave. And then you have the
neediest people remaining in the city. So
the challenge is restoring opportunity for
people to earn a living, raise a family with
the expectation that the next generation
will do better. We need a stronger
economy and that is tied to the education
33
system.
Some leaders were angry that schools bore
the blame for deep-seated social ills and
resented what they perceived as unrealistic
expectations for public education:
[Public education] has become the flash
point for societal concerns like race and
class. We think we just need to come up
with the right education plan and then we
can make public education [and society]
34
work. This is simplistic.
Clearly, Philadelphia’s leaders offered
contrasting ideas about what it would take
to strengthen the city and what the public
could expect schools to do in that effort.
Their varying analyses of urban problems
and the role of public education
foreshadowed the different criteria by
which they would judge any educational
reform. Some judged reform on its ability
to hold middle-class families with schoolage children in the city; others judged the
system’s ability to positively impact the life
chances of those it has consistently failed
— poor children of color.

33

School Board member, March 2000.

34

Civic leader, May 2000.
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POWERFUL MESSAGES
WITH MANY
INTERPRETATIONS

S

uperintendent David Hornbeck’s
plan for improving Philadelphia’s
schools, Children Achieving, was a
reform agenda with powerful ideas,
ambitious goals, and broad scope.
Hornbeck had strong beliefs about what
public schools could and should do. He was
passionate in his assertions that: “Results
matter. It’s not enough to work hard,” “All
children can achieve at high levels,” and
“Adults’ expectations of students have
been too low and this has contributed to
the consistently low achievement levels in
35
our schools.” Hornbeck pledged that
every student would achieve proficiency in
three core subject areas (math, reading,
and science) by 2008. In laying out his plan,
the new superintendent argued that
previous attempts at reforms had failed
because they were too incremental, too
narrowly framed, and did not attempt to
alter the “system” itself. He believed that a
more comprehensive strategy was
necessary — one that changed all parts of
the system all at once. Superintendent
Hornbeck identified 10 reform components
which were necessary in order for
Philadelphia schools to meet the new
ambitious student performance goals (see
Sidebar 2 on page 18). Hornbeck’s
message was powerful and resonated with
a community eager for change.
The language describing the reform
components, however, was abstract and
laden with educational terms unfamiliar to
most people and open to many
interpretations. The critical levers for
change in Children Achieving were
standards, accountability, and
decentralization. Based on the Children
Achieving Action Design, District leaders
35

Excerpts from speeches by the Superintendent.
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began restructuring the system in line with
the major ideas of the reform. Educators
and parents, and community members
developed content standards to guide
curriculum and instruction by establishing
what students should know and be able to
do. Central administrators set targets for
schools and monitored their students’
progress on indicators such as standardized
test scores, attendance, and promotion
and graduation rates which comprised the
District’s Performance Responsibility Index
(PRI). The District offered rewards and
sanctions to school staffs based on their
schools’ progress toward meeting their
targets. The District was divided into 22
neighborhood clusters, each serving a
comprehensive high school and its feeder
elementary and middle schools. Cluster
offices were established to offer guidance
and support to their schools. In turn,
schools were reorganized into small
learning communities composed of 250400 students and their teachers. Small
learning communities were designed to
offer more personalized teaching and
learning environments and to customize
curriculum and instruction to meet the
needs of their students. Schools were
encouraged to create local school councils
of teachers, parents, and administrators to
set school policies.
The District established a system of
supports to help schools meet their
performance targets. These included:
clusters, as described above; the
Curriculum Frameworks, to give more
guidance to teachers in how to implement
the new standards; the Teaching and
Learning Network, to provide direct
support (i.e., professional development,
advice on how to implement new District
policies) to schools and teachers; and the
Family Resource Network, to coordinate
the many “safety net” human services
supports that so many poor children need.

18
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SIDEBAR 2. THE CHILDREN ACHIEVING 10-POINT ACTION DESIGN
In 1995, the District released the Children Achieving Action Design in which it articulated 10
reform components necessary to achieve its goals. The following are excerpts from District
documents and the Superintendent’s speeches that enumerate these 10 components:
•

We must behave as if we believe that all students will learn at high levels.

•

Standards-based reform will drive the system…We must set standards, have new
assessment strategies, and develop new incentive systems for both adults and students.

•

Decisions will be made at the school level…Authority for decisions about personnel,
budget, professional development, instructional strategies and curriculum, scheduling,
student and teacher assignments inside of a school, and, perhaps, discipline, should be
made at the school level…In addition to school employees, parents must also be partners in
making those decisions.

•

Staff development is critical to improved performance.

•

Early childhood support is less expensive and more effective…There are at least three areas
of focus important to school readiness: supports for families; health and social services; and
full-day kindergarten, pre-kindergarten, and childcare.

•

Community services and supports can make the difference between success and failure.
Children who are unhealthy, hungry, abused, ill-housed, ill-clothed, or otherwise face the
kinds of problems outside of the school borne of poverty cannot achieve at high levels.

•

Adequate technology, instructional materials, and facilities are necessary to learning.

•

Strong public engagement is required. Unless parents, civic leaders, elected officials, the
business community, postsecondary educators, and the wider citizenry understand and
support radical change, we cannot sustain it.

•

We must have adequate resources and use them effectively.

•

We must do all of these nine components. The agenda is not a pick-and-choose menu. We
must approach the challenge of education reform in a comprehensive and integrated way. If
one or more features of the whole agenda is not implemented, its power to yield high
performance by all students will be significantly diminished.36

THE CHILDREN ACHIEVING
PLAN: “COMPREHENSIVE” AND
“COMMON SENSE”
When our informants discussed Children
Achieving, it was not in terms of specific
36

initiatives or components such as clusters,
small learning communities, or the new
standardized assessments, but in terms of
its broad approach to educational
improvement. Interviewees, whether from
business, government, civic institutions,
grassroots groups, higher education, or the

School District of Philadelphia, Children Achieving strategic action design.
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media, portrayed the plan as
“comprehensive” and “complex.” They
often recited Hornbeck’s admonition that
“it was not a pick-and-choose agenda” and
that changes must occur throughout the
system all at once. And perhaps most
tellingly, they explained that Children
Achieving was “common sense.”
It’s a complex agenda built on simple ideas
about schools. The premise is that you
can’t do just one, two, three things — you
37
need to do it all.
Children Achieving was a logical
38
document.
Children Achieving is a lot of common
sense ideas — it’s not some new brilliant
39
program.
Educators have been trying to do the
things that Children Achieving talks about
40
for years.
Our participants lauded Children Achieving
for its logic. And they noted that its ideas
were not new. However, as we will show,
this broad view of Children Achieving
masked significant differences in
understanding of the reforms.
Of all the sectors included in our sample,
leaders of civic institutions offered the
most praise for the Children Achieving
reform plan. They expressed pride and
gratitude that Philadelphia had a plan —
something they saw that other cities
lacked.

19

established the idea that children can
41
achieve.
When I look at other urban school districts,
I see that in many ways we’re lucky. We
42
have a strong reform plan.
We have something to build on, but we
have to remember that it takes a long time.
What’s positive is the amount of work
being done, the focus on high expectations
and changing practice, professional
development, and involving the community
43
in schools.
Civic leaders saw the plan as a foundation
on which to build, the strongest legacy of
the Children Achieving era.
Accountability was the most frequently
mentioned characteristic of the reform by
participants across all sectors. For the
majority of our participants, the
accountability system was not only the
clearest aspect of the reform, it was also
the most important — the driver of
everything else. A few, such as the business
leader below, considered accountability
the reform itself and criticized Hornbeck for
complicating a straightforward message
and losing the focus necessary to achieve
results.
Children Achieving was all about
accountability. He [Hornbeck] made it
complicated with the 10 points. He could
have made it much more simple by
focusing on the accountability piece. The
44
loss of that was the loss of the message.

David did Philadelphia the favor of showing
up with a concerted agenda that

The second most often-mentioned
characteristic of Children Achieving was its
emphasis on the idea that all children can

37

Foundation leader, October 2000.

41

Government leader, March 2000.

38

Civic leader, August 2000.

42

Civic leader, February 2000.

39

Former School Board member, October 2000.

43

Civic leader, March 2000.

40

School District staff member, May 2000.

44

Business leader, November 2000.
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achieve and participants linked this idea
closely to Hornbeck as an individual.
The best thing that David did was
convincing people that every child can
45
actually learn.
[Children Achieving’s goal] has been to
change the mindset about what we can do
to make sure kids learn. The basic tenet is
that all children can learn and I think he’s
46
[Hornbeck] so right about that.
Although the vast majority of the people
we talked to commended the ideas of the
reform plan, there were a few exceptions.
These participants argued that while the
rhetoric of Children Achieving was
seductive, the plan was unrealistic. A labor
leader argued that it did not address the
realities of schools, particularly schools’
lack of resources for meeting the many
needs of poor urban students:
How can you argue against Children
Achieving? You can’t. It’s like Bambi. But
47
you have to look at the reality.
A government leader who supported
school choice as a solution to the problems
of the schools said:
Children Achieving does not have meaning
to the customer. What is Children
Achieving? Is it reading, writing, and math?
Children Achieving is a phrase to use as an
organizing tool for marketing. It’s a feel48
good-about-the-system ploy.
On the surface, almost all of our
interviewees accepted Children Achieving’s
major premises. However this apparent
unity of belief was deceptive. When we
45

Civic leader, August 2000.
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Foundation leader, January 2000.
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Labor leader, August 2000.
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Government leader, October 2000.

probed their views of Children Achieving
more deeply, it became apparent that
there were competing understandings of
the major ideas underlying the reform —
particularly standards, accountability, and
decentralization.

MULTIPLE INTERPRETATIONS
OF CHILDREN ACHIEVING
A theory of action is the set of assumptions
and beliefs that reform leaders hold about
how their efforts that will work together to
cause desired improvements. We have
described Children Achieving’s theory of
action as follows:
If the central administration works with the
schools and the community to set high
academic standards for student
achievement; aligns assessment with those
standards; establishes an accountability
system that offers strong incentives;
delegates more authority over school
resources, organization, policies, and
programs to the schools; monitors equity
throughout the organization; and builds
public understanding and support for
reform; and if central administration and
cluster staff provide guidance and highquality support to schools and small
learning communities, then the teachers
and administrators of the Philadelphia
schools, in consultation with their
communities, will customize instructional
technologies and patterns of behavior that
49
will help all children reach high standards.
Did Philadelphia’s leaders subscribe to this
theory of action? Did they understand it?
No matter how strong the educational
improvement plan or how visionary the
district leadership, there must be sustained
49
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support from civic elites and ordinary
citizens in order for reform strategies to
take hold and spread in urban schools. In
addition to educational bureaucracy and
human resistance to change, contentious
politics and scarce resources have
consistently undermined full
50
implementation of reform ideas and plans.
Coalitions of support and institutional
alliances are necessary. What does it take
to create such coalitions and partnerships?
In their analysis of the Chicago reform,
Shipps, Sconzert, and Swyers argue that
reform leaders must understand the
perspectives of local constituencies so that
their reforms will gain legitimacy in the
community. Such understanding helps
reform leaders craft approaches to
improvement or theories of action that
51
make sense to local stakeholders. It also
helps reform leaders anticipate when they
will need to compromise in order to gain
broader support and build ownership. Like
52
Hill, Campbell, and Harvey, Shipps,
Sconzert, and Swyers also argue that
reform approaches need to be flexible. In
their view, no one strategy is likely to
transform schools and improve student
learning by itself. “Hybrid” reforms are
more promising. They are also more likely
to appeal to wide range of constituencies,
especially if they emerge from ongoing
discussions of reform ideas and revisions to
original plans when necessary.
Lingard and his colleagues offer another
perspective on reform strategies. They
point out that too often reforms are
discarded without an understanding of
what ideas actually succeeded or failed.
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They argue that any single theory of
improvement often contains competing
concepts that are lost in the often-abstract
53
language of school reform. They show
how particular reform ideas, in their case,
“school-based management,” far from
being a consistently understood and
unified theory of change, are often
politically contested and have competing
meanings. Recent research on the
standards movement in the United States
54
has supported this. It has pointed to the
varying interpretations of “standards” and
the very different implications that each of
these interpretations carries for such
educational practices as assessment of
student learning (standardized tests versus
performance-based assessment) and
pedagogy (scripted lessons that develop
students’ basic skills versus constructivist
teaching and learning that values inquiry
and meaning making).
In the following discussion, we show that
there were competing interpretations of
the ideas underlying Children Achieving.
Our interviewees read the abstract ideas of
standards, accountability, and
decentralization through the lens of their
own theories of how to improve public
education. In other words, they heard what
they wanted and expected to hear from
the perspective of their personal theories
about what actions would improve public
education.
We asked leaders what they perceived to
be the successes and failures of the reform,
what they thought ought to be continued,
and what changes they believed were
53
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necessary to improve schools and student
achievement in the future. From their
responses, we discerned five theories of
action which we have named: managerial,
redistribution of resources, democratic
revitalization, teaching and learning, and
55
market. It should be noted that few
participants spoke from only one theory of
action. Most drew from multiple theories of
action in their articulations of the problems
facing schools and what needed to be
done; sometimes there were contradictory
theories operating at the same time in their
accounts.
There were, however, some broad patterns
of similarity among participants within
sectors. Business and political leaders
focused on the need for a strong
managerial model. Some combined this
with a market approach, describing school
choice as the most logical and powerful
solution to a poorly performing school
system. Grassroots leaders and civic
leaders, Children Achieving Challenge staff,
and District employees saw economic
inequality and racial discrimination as the
most significant issues confronting schools
(and the broader society). They called for a
redistribution of resources that would
provide students from groups who have
traditionally performed poorly with the
better-designed and more intensive
supports needed to ensure their school
success. Grassroots, civic, and foundation
leaders were also likely to call for increased
public engagement, thereby voicing the
values of democratic revitalization. Higher
education, civic, and foundation leaders
focused on teaching and learning as the
pathway to improving student
performance.
Below we examine these five theories of
action. We describe how each theory
framed the major problems of the city’s
55

Some of these theories are drawn from the work of
Shipps, Sconzert, and Swyers (see footnote 51), and
Lingard, Hayes, and Mills (see footnote 53).

schools and the solutions it offered to
those problems. We also identify the
interpretations each theory offered for the
important ideas of Children Achieving —
standards, accountability, and
decentralization.

MANAGERIAL
Participants from the business and
government sectors were most likely to
view Children Achieving from a managerial
perspective. From this perspective, low
student achievement is seen as the result of
weak efforts by adults and students.
Managerialists advocate for outcomesbased reforms and a system of incentives
and sanctions to encourage school staff
and students to ratchet up their
performance. The role of central
administrators is to set clear performance
targets and then give school-level
administrators the authority to decide how
to meet those targets. The purpose of
decentralization is to give discretion to
school staff so that professional autonomy
is commensurate with accountability. So,
for example, the managerial approach
would not use decentralization as a means
to increase the role of parents in school
decision-making, but as a means to
increase the responsibility of school staff to
solve students’ educational problems.
What is important are clear accountability
targets, therefore standards need to be
precise. In this theory of action, there is
little concern that standardized tests will
narrow curriculum and instruction.
Those of our participants who spoke from
this theory of action often wanted District
leaders to be political pragmatists who
“could get the job done;” they wanted
principals to have authority to hire staff and
more discretion over teachers’ time; they
wanted the teachers’ union to make

Civic Engagement and Urban School Improvement: Hard-to-Learn Lessons from Philadelphia

23

TABLE 1. COMPETING THEORIES OF ACTION
Theory of Action

Problem Definition

Action Plan

Purpose of Standards

Lines of Accountability

Systemic Reform
(Hornbeck)
Guidance for
educational
improvement from a
distance through
alignment of policies,
resources, and
incentives.

Lack of alignment of
policies has created
fragmentation and
incoherence. Lack of
accountability for
performance.

Establish standards, monitor
progress, and offer
incentives for performance.
Align policies and
resources. Build capacity
through professional
development.

Standards are
important because they
offer direction for
aligning curriculum,
assessment, allocation
of resources, and
professional
development.

Lines for accountability
follow district organizational
chart. Public reporting of
data on schools’ progress
toward performance targets
also makes educators
accountable to community
stakeholders.

Managerial
(Business and
government leaders)
Frontline managers are
accountable for student
performance with
concomitant discretion
over decision-making.

Lack of accountability for
results. Centralized
bureaucracy and teacher
contract are impediments to
frontline managers
(principals).

Set clear targets for
performance and hold
everyone accountable for
results. Give frontline
managers more discretion
over work rules, resources,
etc. Build capacity of
frontline managers.

Lines for accountability
follow the district
organizational chart;
employees are responsible
to their supervisor.

Redistribution of
Resources
(Grassroots leaders,
Children Achieving
Challenge staff, and
District employees)
Reallocate resources so
that students who have
traditionally performed
poorly receive the
supports they need to
meet rigorous
standards.

Economic and racial
inequality. Insufficient
resources devoted to
support all students in
reaching rigorous
standards.

Generate public discussion
about root causes of
inequality and build
consensus about strategies
for addressing them.
Mobilize resources from
federal, state, and city
governments, and private
sources.

Standards are
important because they
offer clear targets for
performance and are
the basis for a system
of rewards and
sanctions. With clear
targets, educators and
students will ratchet up
their performance.
Standards are
important because they
leverage socially
equitable student
outcomes. All students,
regardless of their race,
class, and gender, will
have access to a
rigorous curriculum and
the supports necessary
to meet new
requirements.

Lines for accountability
follow the district
organizational chart. When
combined with democratic
revitalization, community
stakeholders play an
important role in
accountability.

Roles in a Decentralized
System
Central office sets
targets for schools,
monitors students’
progress, and offers
rewards or sanctions to
frontline educators
based on performance.
Authority for decisions
about personnel,
budget, instructional
strategies, and
curriculum belong to
schools.
Central administration
sets clear targets for
performance. Frontline
managers have broad
discretion for hiring staff,
allocating resources, and
customizing the
educational program to
fit local context.
Central office sets
standards and monitors
performance. Authority
for decisions about
educational program can
be made at any level,
but the central office
must play a vigilant role
in monitoring the
equitable distribution of
resources. When
combined with
democratic revitalization,
community stakeholders
play an important role in
monitoring equity.
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TABLE 1. COMPETING THEORIES OF ACTION (CONTINUED)
Theory of Action

Problem Definition

Action Plan

Purpose of Standards

Lines of Accountability

Democratic
Revitalization
(Civic, foundation, and
grassroots leaders)
Reform plan emerges
from a broad public
dialogue about
purposes of education.

Schools controlled by
educational bureaucracy
that is resistant to input of
parents and community
members. Lack of a broad
public dialogue on the
purposes of schools.

Standards are
important because they
offer the opportunity
for community
stakeholders to
articulate what they
want their students to
learn.

Educators are accountable
to their community
stakeholders.

Teaching and Learning
(Higher education,
foundation, and civic
leaders)
Invigorate curriculum
and instruction to
emphasize critical
thinking. Invest in
professional
development for
educators.
Market
(Business and
government leaders)
Place schools under
market conditions so
that parents can choose
the best school for their
children.

Insufficient attention to
curriculum and instruction,
the development of school
leaders, and the ongoing
learning of teachers.

Promote public dialogue
about purposes of
education. Make
information about schools
readily accessible to public
and create many avenues
for civic engagement in
schools. Make local school
councils authentic sites for
community participation in
decisions.
Invest in professional
development for principals,
teachers, and support
personnel. Seek out and/or
develop high-quality,
rigorous curriculum. Provide
many support services for
students who need help
reaching high standards.

Standards are
important because they
offer a framework for
curriculum development and imply an
instructional approach.

Educators are accountable
to their colleagues for
continuing to grow
professionally, participating
in school decision-making,
and for student learning.

School staff who share a
common mission and
pedagogical approach
customize an
educational program for
their students.

Create many educational
options and give parents
the resources to choose
what is appropriate for their
children.

Parents use their own
standards to select
schools for their
children.

Parents hold schools
accountable through choice.

Educators (program
developers, vendors)
select the educational
model for their schools.
The degree of parent
involvement in this
process depends on the
model.

System lacks choice,
competition, and
entrepreneurship.

Roles in a Decentralized
System
Local community
members play the key
role in hiring school
management, setting
local school policy and
monitoring outcomes.
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concessions to management about the role
of seniority in job assignments and about
work conditions in exchange for increases
in compensation. One of our interviewees
crystallized the managerial theory of action.
Some of his comments included:

critical to improving student performance.
If teachers believe that students can
achieve at high levels, then they will teach
an enriched and rigorous curriculum to all
students, regardless of their race, class,
and gender.

Children Achieving was all about
accountability.

Those advocating for a redistribution of
resources call for a broad discussion about
the reasons for inequities and the building
of an advocacy base to correct them. This
view overlaps with the Democratic
Revitalization theory of action which also
calls for broad public discussion about
public education.

He [the Superintendent] was a missionary in
the way he was so fervent in his approach.
You have to be practical to get things done
sometimes.
The [teachers’] contract is a big burden. It’s
56
all the work rules, the crazy work rules.

REDISTRIBUTION OF RESOURCES
Grassroots civic leaders, Children
Achieving Challenge staff, and District
employees were advocates for
redistributing resources. In this theory of
action, the problem of low student
achievement in urban schools is the result
of social injustice. Schools reflect the
inequities of the broader society and
reproduce them. Taken-for-granted
practices, such as ability tracking, staff
transfer, and seniority policies that assign
the least-experienced and least-qualified
staff to schools with the highest
concentrations of families in poverty, are
unfair. Increased resources distributed
according to need are key to assuring
equitable outcomes.
The redistributing resources discourse
about standards emphasizes the
development of high expectations as a
necessary precursor to achieving equitable
student outcomes. The assumption is that
differences in academic performance
correlate with race and class because of
adults’ beliefs that poor students and
students of color cannot achieve at high
levels. Changing adult expectations is
56

Business leader, November 2000.

Disaggregated data that reports outcomes
for students by race/ethnicity, economic
status, etc. is key to this theory of action.
Credible information about all students’
learning is essential to decisions about how
to allocate and direct supports to students
who are not meeting standards. During
Children Achieving, new ways of reporting
student data brought attention to
educational inequities and the District
conducted a number of policy studies that
focused on questions of equity. Proponents
of this theory of action argue that any
decentralization initiatives must be
accompanied by vigilant monitoring of
equity. During Children Achieving, reform
leaders reflected that belief by pulling back
from their initial decentralization of
authority measures as they reviewed
evidence that reforms were not closing the
57
achievement gap between racial groups.
A civic leader articulated this theory of
action:
I really credit Children Achieving with
putting the notion on the table that these
kids should have a really good school
system. I think being persistent about the
57
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idea is good. We shouldn’t have a double
standard for suburban and urban kids.
Hornbeck has mounted a serious
meaningful effort to improve the schools
here. Before it was always less than great.
The mentality was “we can’t do that here.”
It’s been that way for as long as I’ve been
around. Not building the support for the
program is problematic. I think he has
tried, but he could have done more. But
then I don’t think the business community
or the PFT [Philadelphia Federation of
Teachers] tried to help either. This has
been a more serious attempt to get Philly
schools to achieve at the same level as
suburban schools. The attitude isn’t “let’s
do the best we can given the poor material
we have to work with,” but let’s do it fairly
for everyone and gradually over the long
58
term.
Those who advocated for a redistribution
of resources were more concerned that
Philadelphia’s public schools better serve
students of color and interrupt the cycle of
poverty and disadvantage than that they
strengthen the market economy, satisfy
corporate desires for an educated
workforce, or provide islands of
educational excellence for middle-class
families.
Superintendent Hornbeck’s very public and
persistent fight for fair funding marked him,
more than any other city figure, as a leader
of the struggle for social justice in
education. He remained a hero to many
grassroots leaders and parents we
interviewed, even as support for him
crumbled in other sectors.

DEMOCRATIC REVITALIZATION
Leaders from civic institutions, grassroots
groups, and foundations were represented
in this category. Proponents of democratic
revitalization view centralized bureaucracy
as the obstacle to educational renewal.
58

Civic leader, April 2000.

They argue for a broad public dialogue on
the purposes of education that would serve
as the foundation for a covenant between a
community and its schools. The articulation
of standards for students’ learning is part
of the public discussion and lays the
groundwork for accountability of schools to
the community. The purpose of
decentralization is to increase
parental/community authority in local
school councils. Participants speaking from
this perspective critiqued Children
Achieving’s failure to “change power
relationships” and to “create a public
clamor for change.”
The problem is that we made some
structural changes but we did not change
the power or authority relationships in
schools and between school people and
59
the community.
My main criticism about Children Achieving
is that you can’t do this kind of reform
without more widespread support. There
needs to be a demand for it. There are
other parents and community leaders who
could support the agenda more strongly,
but I don’t think the District tried to
engage those people and it cost them in
the end. You can’t have a large program
like this without good salesmanship. I think
that’s the crucial missing piece of this
agenda. You can't just come up with some
good ideas and then have quiet
conversations with your 10 closest friends
and expect things to change radically. It’s
not enough. You need to create a public
clamor for change. That just hasn’t
happened. I don’t think the public ever
understood much about Children
Achieving. I think if they understood it,
60
they would support it.
Public reporting of data redefines the
relationship between the District and the
59
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community and encourages greater public
engagement in school reform. From this
perspective, a major accomplishment of
Children Achieving was making data
available for public scrutiny. The weak
implementation of local school councils and
lack of support for their authority was a
major disappointment. Often the civic
leaders calling for democratic revitalization
also viewed inequities in the educational
system as the root of many of its problems.

TEACHING AND LEARNING
Higher education leaders, civic leaders, and
foundation staff were proponents of the
teaching and learning theory of action.
Supporters of this theory of action focus on
the ongoing learning of educational
practitioners, the professionalization of the
teaching force, and the implementation of
educational innovations such as wholeschool reform models as the means of
change. Fullan has been a strong advocate
for this theory of action. He argues that
“changes at the bottom” are as necessary
for systemic change as policy alignment at
the top. He suggests two bottom-up
strategies. One is the large-scale
networking of schools with outside partners
who can bring high-quality professional
development and other resources to bear
on the challenges of schools. And the
second is a reculturing of schools so that
the ongoing learning of practitioners and
continuous improvement of practice are
61
the underpinnings of school reform.
Those working from this theory of action
look to standards to offer teachers
guidance about what should be taught and
how. At the same time, decentralization
should offer school educators discretion
over decisions about curriculum and
instruction because they are the
professionals and they have the most
knowledge about their students’ needs,

interests, and abilities. This theory of action
emphasizes non-hierarchical accountability.
Strong collegial relationships among
teachers promote a culture of collective
responsibility for student achievement.
Developing an infrastructure of expertise
and support outside the District (higher
education institutions, community and
cultural organizations) that can work with
school staff to improve teaching and
learning is also an important component.
From the vantage point of teaching and
learning as a theory of action, full-day
kindergarten and Children Achieving’s
attention to increasing opportunities for
professional development were major
accomplishments. Some of the
interviewees who supported this theory of
action expressed disappointment that,
despite reform leaders’ intentions, it had
proved extremely difficult for Children
Achieving to reach classrooms.
We’re not talking about the classrooms.
That is the hardest. The biggest
disappointment is that we’re not paying
attention to teachers in the classroom. We
62
just do peripheral things. . .
Others believed that the reform plan was
weak in its mechanisms for developing
school leadership and bemoaned the
District’s lack of investment in its frontline
educators.
David didn’t pay any attention to the
leadership skills of principals. Imagine what
could have happened if we had focused on
63
leadership development.

MARKET
The market-based theory of action asserts
that schools will improve only if they are
placed under market conditions, in which
62

Civic leader, March 2000.
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Civic leader, October 2000.
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SIDEBAR 3. SCHOOL CHOICE AS A THEORY OF CHANGE:
GOVERNOR RIDGE’S EDUCATION REFORM PROPOSALS
Governor Tom Ridge’s education policy agenda differed radically from Children Achieving’s
systemic reform approach. The theory of change underlying his reform proposals was that
schools would only improve if they were placed under market conditions, in which parents were
consumers and could choose what they considered to be the best school for their children. The
exercise of choice would force ineffective schools out of business as parents moved their
children to schools that were successful. Throughout his administration, Governor Ridge
advocated the creation of charter schools, the institution of vouchers, and the privatization of
school systems that were experiencing chronic and widespread failure as remedies to overcome
entrenched bureaucracy and improve performances.
Five months after taking office, Ridge proposed a statewide voucher plan, called, “Keystone
Initiative for a Difference in Our Schools,” designed to provide “educational opportunity
grants” to families throughout Pennsylvania. The opportunity grants, or vouchers, could be used
at private, religious, or out-of-district public schools. They would initially go to families making
$15,000 or less a year and eventually to families making $70,000 or less. If the plan had been
adopted, 52,000 students would have been eligible in the first year, more than half of them
residing in Philadelphia. Shortly after its introduction, the bill was rejected in the House by
seven votes.
Ridge’s second effort to promote vouchers was in spring of 1999. He introduced another
statewide plan, called the Academic Recovery Act, designed to provide “super-vouchers” to
students in the most academically troubled school districts. He wrote $63 million into the state
budget to pay for a statewide pilot program, only to find that he again did not have the support
needed from the legislature to start the program.
In spring 2001, Ridge finally succeeded in passing an education plan that included bills that
many observers considered a backdoor to vouchers. The plan exchanged an increase in teacher
pensions for a package of education bills that provided grants to parents for after-school
tutoring if their children are failing state tests. And perhaps most controversially, the bill allows
state tax credits of up to 90 percent to corporations for donations to groups financing
scholarships to private schools or public schools outside of students’ home districts. These two
provisions of the package were unique nationally. Another aspect of the package that
supported privatization efforts was a bill that allowed school districts to create “independent
schools” that were similar to charter schools, but did not have to start from scratch.

parents are consumers and can choose
what they consider to be the best schools
for their children. This theory assumes that
if people have a choice, they will leave
schools that aren’t working and those
schools will have to improve or “go out of
business.” Vouchers, charter schools,
privatization of schools, and outsourcing of
district services are among the most
prominent mechanisms of reform for

advocates of this theory of action. (See
Sidebar 3 about Governor Ridge.)
In Philadelphia, the market theory of action
was discussed as a strategy for attracting
and keeping middle- and working-class
families in the city.
The way I see it, it’s a way to keep the
Catholic school system alive and well. If
those schools crumble, then the city
crumbles, and those schools deserve
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support. Besides that, the poor single
mother should have the same rights as you
and I. She should have the same right to
64
choose.
People aren’t using the schools. They’re
going to charter schools or people are
leaving the city. It’s all about market
conditions. If people have a choice, they
65
don’t choose the public schools.

DISCUSSION
Children Achieving was an ambitious
reform plan held together by a set of
powerful ideas about how to improve
student performance. But as we have
demonstrated in this section, the abstract
and ambiguous rhetoric surrounding
systemic reform was open to many
interpretations. People understood
standards, decentralization, and
accountability from their own frame of
reference. These differences in
interpretation were masked by the plan’s
appeal to logic and common sense, and its
complexity and comprehensiveness.
How did differences in interpretation play
out? When did they surface? One example
was around the District’s decentralization
plans. As originally articulated, Children
Achieving aimed to put decisions about
curriculum and instruction in the hands of
frontline practitioners and, at the same
time, to engage parents in school policy
decisions through local school councils.
Business leaders, the Commonwealth
Association of School Administrators (the
school administrators’ bargaining unit), and
others working from a managerial
perspective heard the emphasis on schoollevel decision-making as a means of giving
greater control and autonomy to school
principals. But grassroots community
groups like the Alliance Organizing Project
64

Business leader, November 2000.

65

Government leader, October 2000.
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(AOP) focused on local school councils as
sites for democratic decision-making that
involved parents as substantive partners in
shaping school policy (democratic
revitalization). The AOP was funded by the
Children Achieving Challenge to train
parents to be leaders in their schools,
advocates for their children, and
supporters for the overall reform effort.
Often school staff, especially principals,
were threatened by the new role for
parents and disgruntled by parents who
were sometimes vocal in their critique of
school practices. When school principals
complained that the AOP’s work with
parents in their schools was undermining
administrative authority, business leaders at
Greater Philadelphia First were inclined to
reduce AOP’s funding. While they
ultimately decided to continue to support
AOP financially, the organizing group was
barred from working in any school where
the principal was not open to the idea. Our
research indicated that there were never
broad discussions of these competing
philosophies of decentralization. Instead,
feelings of betrayal festered.
Likewise, although almost all of our
interviewees lauded the Superintendent’s
insistence that “all children can achieve,”
this belief had different implications
depending on perspective. For
managerialists, particularly business
leaders, it provided an ethical justification
for the accountability system: If we believe
that all children can achieve at high levels,
holding the adults who teach them
responsible for their learning is the right
thing to do. They were less likely to heed
the message of redistribution of resources
intended by the Superintendent. One
event put the difference in high relief. On
the night Hornbeck proposed to the Board
of Education that it remove admissions
criteria for special programs and schools so
that they would be accessible to a wider
range of students, Mayor Rendell made a
rare appearance at the Board’s meeting.
He successfully urged School Board
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members to leave the criteria in place. He
argued that dismantling these programs
would further increase the tide of middleclass parents leaving the city in search of
strong academic programs. The Board
voted to leave the criteria in place.
Different perspectives on what it would
take to improve public education remained
undiscussed for other reasons. One was the
close association of the reform’s ideas with
Hornbeck and people’s perception that he
would breach no disagreement. As we will
see in the next section of this report, the
larger political and economic context of
inadequate resources also played a
significant role in discouraging open
dialogue about differences. As District
leaders struggled to make the case for
fairer funding, civic leaders, especially,
were reluctant to voice dissent about the
plan. They feared giving ammunition to
political leaders who wanted to discredit
the reform and the Superintendent.
Even remembering that our interviews
occurred before the state took the last
steps toward takeover, we were surprised
by how little we heard about the market
theory of action despite its prominence as
a priority of then-Governor Ridge. Our
participants framed the struggle between
state and city leaders as a debate about
the costs of adequately financing the city’s
schools and the state’s responsibility in that
funding. They focused on the state’s failure
to institute more equitable school funding
policies and Hornbeck’s confrontational
style which they saw as an inappropriate
strategy for securing public support and
state cooperation. Only rarely did an
interviewee discuss the different
approaches to improving public education
offered by the Superintendent and the
Governor.
Several of our interviewees noted that it
was very difficult to raise questions about
the plan or mount an argument or offer
another perspective in the face of the

compelling logic of “We must change all
levels of the system at once.” One civic
leader crystallized this problem:
The completeness of his [Hornbeck’s] vision
wasn’t amenable to questioning. You
66
couldn’t tamper with any part of it.
The Superintendent’s posture of “You’re
either for me or against me” compounded
this dilemma, as did the increasing
centralization of decision-making. As we
will detail in the next section of this report,
important decisions and the discussions
and debates leading to them were located
in a handful of people and were therefore
invisible to frontline educators, parents, the
general public, and central office
administrators not part of the inner circle.
The moral dimensions of the reform’s
message and their close association with
Hornbeck were barriers to principled
discussions of important values, beliefs,
and ideas underlying the reform.
Hornbeck’s ownership of the reform and
the reform’s dependence on him as its
leader and visionary permeated the
interviews.
Some participants saw this as problematic.
A business leader said that the
Superintendent’s centrality distracted
attention from the plan and its ideas.
Anytime you find someone as messianic as
David, it’s hard not to concentrate on him
67
instead of the agenda.
And a grassroots leader worried that
Hornbeck’s ideology might be a barrier to
coalition building.
Children Achieving is a package deal, and
he’s a zealot, and he’s on a crusade. I knew

66

Civic leader, March 2000.

67

Business leader, October 2000.
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from the first meeting that it was going to
68
be a tense next few years.

thought people did not talk about the
implications of “All students can achieve:”

These and other participants believed that
the close association of the reform plan
with the Superintendent was in conflict with
building broad ownership of Children
Achieving. The centrality of the
Superintendent and his beliefs posed an
obstacle to the difficult conversations
necessary to building deep understanding
of, and investment in, the reform’s ideas.

David said it, but no one heard it. David
said that the issue of public education is
not about time, it’s about commitment. He
said that all children can achieve at high
levels if we really commit to them and
don’t just give them a certain amount of
time in the classroom. There was a
philosophical question here: How high of a
level does he mean? That confused a lot of
people…

Few interviewees delved beneath the
rhetoric of “All students can achieve” to
explore the meaning and implications for
curriculum and instruction, funding, and
public engagement that District leaders
had intended. In her discussion of Children
Achieving’s legacy, one District leader
identified two beliefs central to the reform
commonly overlooked by civic leaders.
Some of the important things that have
been a part of Children Achieving are the
focus on rigorous standards, and rigorous
standards for all children. It may take
differentiated instruction and different
amounts of time for children to reach those
standards, but we can’t start with an
assumption that there are different
69
standards for different children.
The first assumption contained in her
statement — that there should be high
standards for all — was familiar to and
embraced by most of the people we
interviewed. The second assumption —
that there may need to be different
instructional approaches, different levels of
resources, different amounts of time in
order for all students to meet the standards
— was rarely mentioned by interviewees.
One business leader explained why he

68

Historically, the only thing American public
education has set out to do was to have
students spend a certain amount of time in
school. It has not been about commitment
to their learning. David’s idea of
commitment could have a powerful impact,
70
but we haven’t decided to do it.
In summary, what appeared to be Children
Achieving’s greatest strengths — the
power of its ideas, the coherence of its
plan, and the passion and commitment of
its leadership — also posed obstacles to
broad discussion of competing ideas and
strategies. It is through such discussions
that citizens are able to explore ideas, and
that leaders are able to hear concerns and
either offer retorts or revise their plans.
Such discussions help leaders put aside
their own private theories of action to build
public consensus around a community
theory. Children Achieving never became a
shared community theory, but remained
the theory of a charismatic leader that was
perceived differently by different civic
leaders. Without broad public discussions
and consensus on the strategy, there is
scant likelihood for deep public investment
in a reform’s success.

Civic leader, April 2000.

69

Philadelphia Education Fund, Philadelphia public
school notebook. Philadelphia: Author, 2001.

70

Business leader, October 2000.
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CHILDREN ACHIEVING:
A CALCULATED RISK

B

road-based involvement of a city’s
institutions and citizenry is
necessary for sustainable
improvement of urban
71
schools. Clarence Stone analyzed
school reform in several cities and
identified “civic capacity” as an important
predictor of reform efficacy and staying
power. He defined the term:
Civic capacity concerns the extent to which
different sectors of the community —
business, parents, educators, state and
local officeholders, non-profits, and others
— act in concert around a matter of
community-wide import. It involves
mobilization, that is bringing different
sectors together, but also developing a
shared plan of action…To be lasting, civic
capacity needs an institutional foundation
for interaction among elites and a
“grassroots” base through which ordinary
72
citizens are engaged…

Civic elites and ordinary citizens can press
for more radical improvement strategies
than district insiders and special interest
groups who are likely to cling to traditional
approaches to reform, organization, and
73
labor practices. They can offer the
institutional memory necessary for policy
coherence as educational professionals
come and go. They can sustain
improvement efforts by monitoring
reform’s progress and holding political and
education leaders accountable for
following through on their commitments.
They can serve as watchdogs and witnesses
for those whose interests are often ignored
71

Hill, Campbell, and Harvey, It takes a city.

72

C. Stone, Civic capacity and urban education, p. 2.
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W.C. Rich, Black mayors and school politics: The
failure of reform in Detroit, Gary, and Newark. New
York: Garland Publishing, 1996.
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— poor students of color and students with
disabilities.
But the various stakeholders — educators
and their unions, business elites, city and
state government officials (especially state
legislators who control education budgets),
civic education groups, grassrootsorganizing groups, parents and their
organizations, and foundations — bring
different and competing interests to their
involvement in urban public education.
Gittell argues that:
The determination of any effort to achieve
school reform is affected by which
stakeholders become engaged, the
inclusiveness of their strategies, and the
strength of their commitment and
74
leadership.
David Hornbeck understood the
importance of the “public will” in
improving schools. He made civic
engagement one of the 10 components of
the Children Achieving reform plan.
(“Strong public engagement is required.
Unless parents, civic leaders, elected
officials, the business community,
postsecondary educators, and the wider
citizenry understand and support radical
change, we cannot sustain it.”) In this
section, we discuss the strategies used by
District reform leaders to build civic
engagement in support of Children
Achieving.

A CALCULATED RISK
Children Achieving can be viewed as a
calculated risk. When David Hornbeck took
the job of Superintendent in August 1994,
he had reason to believe that he could
muster the political support needed to win
the additional funding needed to support
his reform plan. The initial design of
74

M. Gittel, “School reform in New York and
Chicago: Revisiting the ecology of local games,”
Urban Affairs Quarterly, (30)1, p. 138.
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Children Achieving was based on the
assumption that the state and the city
would provide more dollars for the schools.
At the time of Hornbeck’s arrival,
Pennsylvania had a Democratic governor,
Democratic majorities in the state
legislature, and Philadelphia had a
Democratic mayor. The Superintendent
also had strong backing from business and
civic leaders in Philadelphia.
District leaders faced obstacles soon after
Hornbeck’s arrival. The teachers’ union was
highly critical of the accountability system
and other reform proposals. One of the
two daily local newspapers, The Daily
News, took a hard line against
75
Superintendent Hornbeck. It ran a series
called, “The Great School Debate,” which
criticized the District on many counts,
including the lack of textbooks in schools,
issues of school safety, and the high cost of
implementing the new cluster system. A
member of the paper’s editorial board
explained why the paper came out so
negatively, so early in the reform:
This paper has high expectations for any
city institution and we land hard where we
see poor performance. I’d say it was a
reflex not an overt decision. We value
political skills and it was clear to us early in
the game that he [Hornbeck] couldn’t get
76
things done in this city.
And City Council members, who were
reluctant to raise taxes to support the
schools, fought back District leaders’
requests for more dollars with criticisms of
75
In contrast, the Philadelphia Inquirer’s editorial staff
urged Philadelphians to give Children Achieving a
chance. It played an important role in educating its
readership about the progress of the District through
its annual “Report Card” on schools. The first report
card, published just two months after Hornbeck
become superintendent, was the first public
announcement ever of information about poverty
rates, dropout rates, teachers’ salaries, and student
performance on the SAT-9.
76

Media leader, April 2000.

the reform plan and the Superintendent.
Superintendent Hornbeck believed these
obstacles could be overcome and District
leaders pursued multiple strategies to
press city and state political leaders to
increase funding to Philadelphia schools.
They intended to align the resources from
the Annenberg Challenge and various
other Philadelphia civic organizations with
the District’s priorities as articulated in the
Children Achieving Action Design. They
would leverage all available funds to show
sufficient early increases in student
performance and prove that the reform
plan merited an increased investment of
local and state dollars. In the meantime,
they also sought to recruit many others into
the fight for increased government
funding. District leaders launched a public
relations campaign to build broad-based
support for the reform; they wooed
business and civic leaders by offering them
seats on various advisory groups and task
forces; they funded community organizing
to build grassroots support. At the same
time they built coalitions and alliances to
lobby for increased dollars for public
education, District leaders also sought
changes in the state funding formula
through the courts.

STRATEGY 1: ALIGN
RESOURCES
In February 1995, six months after David
Hornbeck’s appointment as
Superintendent, the School District
received a $50 million grant from the
Annenberg Challenge. Among the
conditions for receiving the grant were the
requirements to: (1) produce two matching
dollars (i.e., $100 million over five years) for
each one received from Annenberg, and (2)
create an independent management
structure, preferably located in the city’s
corporate community, to provide program,
fiscal, and evaluation oversight of the
grant. The second requirement reflected
the Annenberg Challenge’s misgivings
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about pouring money into large urban
school bureaucracies and its conviction that
radical change from inside districts was
unlikely. District partnerships, they
believed, with their larger communities
would bring resources, advocates,
expertise, and accountability — all of which
were necessary to reforming schools.
Superintendent Hornbeck turned to
Greater Philadelphia First (GPF), an
association of chief executives from the
region’s largest companies, to house the
Children Achieving Challenge. GPF leaders
were, on the one hand, reluctant to
become so closely involved in the workings
of the District and to assume oversight of
the Annenberg Challenge funds, which
dwarfed GPF’s own operating budget. On
the other hand, GPF was headed by
corporate leaders deeply involved in the
civic life of the city. They believed they
could play an important role in supporting
the public schools and they were buoyed
by Hornbeck’s accountability message, an
ingredient they believed had been sorely
lacking in the prior management of the
District’s schools. They believed that the
District’s contract with the Philadelphia
Federation of Teachers was a barrier to
improving public education. Locating the
Challenge at GPF offered business leaders
ready access to the Superintendent and a
platform for pressing their views. Ultimately
they were persuaded to assume oversight
of the Challenge. Furthermore, the
Challenge’s first Executive Director, Vicki
Phillips, had been a colleague of
Superintendent Hornbeck’s in the Kentucky
reform effort. She was recruited by him to
head the Challenge, became a member of
the Superintendent’s Cabinet, and served
on his Executive Committee.
As we have seen, PATHS/PRISM and the
Philadelphia Schools Collaborative served
as important outside partners to the
District under Constance Clayton. Both
organizations had pushed for changes in
the District. Staff at the Pew Charitable
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Trusts who had been instrumental in
recruiting Hornbeck were persuaded that
merging the two reform organizations was
a way to streamline outside partner
organizations and ensure that their work
reflected District priorities, thus avoiding
the kinds of conflicts that had arisen in the
high school restructuring effort. Warren
Simmons, who was prominent in the
national standards movement, was
recruited to head the newly created
Philadelphia Education Fund (PEF). Like
Phillips, Simmons joined the
Superintendent’s Cabinet and Executive
Committee. PEF’s work became more
focused on developing capacity inside
central administration to establish and
implement policies congruent with
standards. It focused less on capacity
building in schools (e.g., technical
assistance to high school small learning
communities, leadership development for
principals, etc.).
A major principle of systemic reform is that
a coherent policy environment is essential
to widespread school improvement;
without such an environment, educational
excellence will be isolated to a few schools.
Policy coherence is achieved instructionally
by setting standards for what students
should know and be able to do and then
aligning curriculum and assessment so that
what is taught and what is measured flow
from the standards. It is achieved
operationally by directing district initiatives
and resources toward meeting the
standards. Fullan described the role of
alignment in systemic reform:
Systemic reform…promises to align the
different parts of the system, focus on the
right things, and marshal and coordinate
resources in agreed-upon directions. The
idea of systemic reform is to define clear
and inspiring learning goals for all students,
to gear instruction to focus on these
directions, and to back up these changes
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with appropriate governance and
77
accountability procedures.
Congruent with that strategy, the Children
Achieving Challenge funds were used to
create the District infrastructure necessary
to enact the reform plan. A Challenge staff
member explained the strategy and its
rationale:
We put our funding behind things that will
help the whole District. That’s why we stay
away from individual schools. So, for
example, we put money behind standards
and assessment and professional
development related to that. Here I’m
talking about professional development in
large ways: getting the two networks [the
Teaching and Learning Network and the
Family Resource Network] up, leadership
development, good information systems in
78
place.
The mechanism for aligning Challenge
funding with District priorities were seven
Work Groups composed of staff from the
central office, clusters, schools, the
Philadelphia Federation of Teachers, and,
in come cases, representatives from critical
partners (e.g., universities, PEF). Each Work
Group was charged with developing
priorities, goals, and implementation plans
for a particular area of the District’s work
(School-to-Career, Standards and
Assessment, and Technology). Funds were
then allocated from both the Children
Achieving Challenge budget and the
District to cover the costs of the Work
Group-approved plans.
But in 1998, the Work Groups were
abandoned with the intention that the
Superintendent’s Cabinet and other
committees would replace their function.
But that never happened. Instead,
77

Fullan, “Turning systemic thinking on its head,” p.
420.
78

Children Achieving Challenge Staff, October 2000.

decisions were made by the
Superintendent and a handful of close
advisors. This new plan resulted in a
diminished role for outside partners as well
as field-based educators like cluster
leaders, principals, and teachers in
establishing the priorities, policies, and
plans of the District. Decision-making was
increasingly isolated in a small group of
people who shared the belief that
coherent, aligned educational policy could
remedy the problems of poor student
achievement.
Raising matching funds to meet the
requirements of the Annenberg grant
presented another opportunity for coalition
building. To a large extent, this opportunity
was lost in Philadelphia. The alignment
strategy made Annenberg dollars virtually
invisible as the Challenge’s monies blended
with District funds to pay for District
infrastructure. Elite support was at least
partly conditioned on their belief that the
Annenberg and matching dollars were not
merely supplanting state and local funds.
When GPF leaders could not point to
specific places grant funds made a
difference, they became uneasy and
complained that they did not receive
adequate or accurate reporting from the
District on how the funds were spent.
Other funders who contributed to the
match became frustrated that their money
entered the “black hole” of District
financial record keeping and they received
little credit or acknowledgement for their
contributions. And people in schools were
frequently unaware that the Annenberg
money even existed and certainly did not
know what it paid for.
In addition, because the Annenberg grant
and the matching funds went to support
new District infrastructures, there was little
attention to building the capacity of
outside organizations to support the
schools. (An exception was the creation of
the Alliance Organizing Project which will
be discussed later in this section.) In fact,
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some existing groups such as Citizens
Committee on Public Education in
Philadelphia withered and died during
Children Achieving. This absence of
intermediary organizations presents a
major problem to education reformers. A
foundation staff member described the
situation:

•

Fourth-graders made educationally and
statistically significant gains. These
gains were likely the result of all-day
kindergarten and the implementation
of a literacy program in the primary
grades in which many schools used
literacy interns to reduce the teacherstudent ratio.

Philadelphia doesn’t have the intermediary
organizations that other cities do. We only
have PEF, and no other intermediary
capacity. There’s potential capacity in the
higher education community, but it’s
applied sporadically. It’s very frustrating,
especially when contrasting it with Boston,
which has so much support in organizations
and people, and a much better economic
79
situation.

•

In middle schools, eighth-graders made
steady, but considerably more modest,
progress than fourth-grade students
during the first four years of Children
Achieving. However, scores in math and
science actually declined slightly in
spring 2000, despite a strong emphasis
on test preparation in classrooms. Our
qualitative research indicated that
changes in curriculum and instruction in
middle schools were more superficial
than in elementary schools.
Furthermore, middle schools suffered
from rampant teacher and principal
turnover that negatively affected their
learning environments.

•

High school students, who performed
abysmally on the first administration of
the SAT-9, made little to no gains
during the early years of the reform.
Performance did improve in years 4 and
5. High school students’ attendance
and persistence rates went up.

STRATEGY 2: IMPROVE
STUDENT PERFORMANCE
As mentioned earlier, reform leaders were
betting that the Annenberg Challenge
grant and its match could be used to
improve performance, and that improved
performance would generate the political
will to obtain increased state funding either
through the courts or the legislature, thus
allowing the reforms to be institutionalized
and continued.
Student test scores, student and staff
attendance, and student persistence did
improve during Children Achieving. But
student gains on the Districtwide test, the
SAT-9, were uneven across the District.
Elementary students made greater gains
than middle and high school students.
Schools with higher concentrations of lowperforming students and students living in
poverty made greater gains than other
80
schools. Our research indicated that:
79

80

Figures 1, 2, and 3 present the test results
by subject and grade level.
The improvements in test scores are
noteworthy because Philadelphia had one
of the most inclusive testing policies in the
country. The District promoted the testing
of all students. Each year the pool of

Foundation leader, November 2000.

W. Boyd and J. B. Christman, “A tall order for
Philadelphia’s new approach to school governance:
Heal the political rifts, close the budget gaps, AND

improve the schools.” In M.D. Usdan and L. Cuban
(Eds.), Powerful reforms with shallow roots:
Educational change in six cities (New York: Teachers
College Press, in press).
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FIGURE 1. PERCENT OF STUDENTS SCORING AT OR ABOVE BASIC IN MATH
BY SCHOOL LEVEL, SAT-9, 1996-200081
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FIGURE 2. PERCENT OF STUDENTS SCORING AT OR ABOVE BASIC IN READING
BY SCHOOL LEVEL, SAT-9, 1996-2000
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For Figures 1, 2, and 3, percent of K-8 students scoring at above basic in math, reading, and science for 19992000 was not available.
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FIGURE 3. PERCENT OF STUDENTS SCORING AT OR ABOVE BASIC IN SCIENCE
BY SCHOOL LEVEL, SAT-9, 1996-2000
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tested students increased, and analyses
show that the additional students were
generally lower performing. The fact that
scores rose significantly despite this was an
encouraging achievement.
There was enormous celebration in the
District about the gains and a huge
investment in telling the “good news.”
What were our participants’ assessments of
the reform’s success? How did they make
sense of the information on test score
results and to what degree did the
District’s performance gains influence their
assessment of the reform’s progress?
Approximately 80 percent cited test scores
as an indicator of some progress, but only
about half of them saw the increases as
meaningful. These respondents believed
that gains were an indication that the
reform plan was a good one and should be
continued with some modifications. Some
commented:

There’s no denying there’s been
improvement. The test scores have gone
up. Not just the District’s tests. If you look
at the Inquirer’s analysis of the state tests,
Philadelphia made more progress than
82
anyone.
I believe the numbers [the test scores].
There was incremental improvement. Given
the handicaps that David had to work
under — some that he created for himself
and some that were there already — my
sense is that, however incremental, there
was legitimate progress where it was most
needed. And that’s among the poor, and
83
among the people who don’t have a lot.

82

Foundation leader, January 2000.

83

Foundation leader, August 2000.
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TEST SCORES WENT UP BUT…
Half of the participants who cited the test
score gains as evidence of some progress,
also expressed skepticism about the
meaningfulness of gains and questioned
the celebratory statements coming from
reform leaders. “The test scores are up,
BUT…” was the view of this group.
There’s been some improvement. Scores
are up, but not enough and not fast
84
enough.
The superintendent has been relentless in
his focus on achievement. That’s the good
side. The bad side is that the schools are
not improving enough — fast enough or
85
across the board enough.
I think the progress, which I don’t want to
minimize, is around the low-hanging fruit
86
on the tree.
They have improved incrementally, at least
the grade schools are doing better. The
test scores seem to be better. But there
has not been much improvement in the
high schools. We were told at the
beginning that there would not be much
we could do for the students in the high
schools, that they were already so far
behind that we couldn’t expect them to
meet high standards. I worry that the
students from the grade schools who have
made progress will go to these same old
high schools with the same old programs
and that they will lose what they have
gained. They will drop out and we will be
87
no better off.

84

Civic leader, March 2000.

85

Media leader, January 2000.

86

87

These participants were reluctant to put
too much faith in test score gains. Some
believed that the pattern of early gains
would not be sustained over the longer
term; others that an over-emphasis on the
test in classroom instruction would
ultimately result in students who were not
prepared for postsecondary education or
for employment in adulthood.
In the short run, if you implement a new
test and have short-term rewards with
accountability indexes and so on, you’ll see
teachers teaching to the test. So short term
you see test scores going up, but you’ll see
later if it really helps kids, or better
prepares them for societal roles. Just
because test scores are going up, I don’t
88
know if kids are any better prepared.
The scores went up. The bottom line is
student performance. The reforms seem to
be making progress. But I worry about
what children are learning. Maybe it is just
teaching to the test. I hope not. I want to
believe that there has been some real
89
progress.
Even though there was improvement on
tests, people in the business community
don’t care about tests. They haven’t seen
results in the kids who are coming to them
looking for jobs out of high school, and
90
that’s what they’re really looking for.
One higher education respondent raised
critical questions about what the test
measured and concluded that testing’s
influence on curriculum and instruction
inevitably narrowed the educational
opportunities for poor students of color:
Testing is a real problem. It’s overly rigid. If
you did that to our kids [White, middleclass students], we wouldn’t stand for it.
88

Children Achieving Challenge staff, July 2000.
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Government leader, July 2000.

90

Former School Board member, October 2000.

School Board member, April 2000.
Business leader, August 2000.
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There’s not equity for poor children. It’s a
cut-rate education for poor children. In
order to engage poor children, we need to
engage their minds, and testing doesn’t do
91
that.

Finally, in a highly contested policy
environment, test gains — like any other
kind of data — are frequently used as
ammunition to defend or oppose a point of
view.

In summary, while a significant majority of
our participants identified test score gains
as an indicator of progress, they were
evenly divided on whether the progress
was meaningful. These findings offer a
cautionary tale to policymakers and reform
leaders about how they use test scores as
evidence of progress. Citizens often do not
know how to interpret test scores; they are
uncertain about appropriate expectations
for gains; they are skeptical about the
means used to obtain gains and they are
distrustful of District claims. As one
business leader said:

STRATEGY 3: SEEK INCREASES
IN CITY AND STATE FUNDING
THROUGH THE POLITICAL
PROCESS

The Annenberg people tell me that
Philadelphia is their best site so I guess we
should be pleased with that. I don’t know
what kind of test score increases to expect.
I am not an expert so I have to rely on
92
others.
In Philadelphia, as in other urban districts
where student achievement has been
abysmal for many years, it was difficult for
citizens to focus on performance gains
when absolute performance was so low
and when they saw and heard so much to
indicate that schools were problem-ridden.
It’s a struggling system. There are lots of
good and committed people and lots of
uninspired and frustrated people in it. It’s
uneven school-to-school, class-to-class. My
sense is that it’s improving, but it has a
huge distance to go in terms of the quality
93
of instruction.
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Higher education leader, November 2000.
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Business leader, August 2000.
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Civic leader, April 2000.

Pennsylvania is a large and conservative
94
state. In the state capitol, rural and
suburban interests have often clashed with
those of Philadelphia and Pittsburgh. This
was compounded for Philadelphia when
the legislature froze the state school
funding formula in 1993, resulting in a
steadily decreasing state contribution to
95
local school districts. In January 2001,
Education Week gave Pennsylvania a grade
of “D-“ on funding equity in comparison to
96
other states. Only seven other states
received a lower grade.
A loyal supporter of Hornbeck’s and board
member of Greater Philadelphia First at the
94

In his case study, “Philadelphia: Prospects and
Challenges” (see footnote 15), Whiting relates that
James Carville, a political consultant to Bill Clinton
and other Democrats, portrayed Pennsylvania as a
state “with two great cities [Pittsburgh and
Philadelphia] at either end and Alabama in
between.” Philadelphians often quote Carville in
their depiction of the political reality that pits
Philadelphia against the state capitol and upstate
rural interests.
95

Actually both urban and rural districts have
suffered under Pennsylvania education finance
policy, but only recently have there been efforts to
build coalitions across the urban/rural divide in
support of finance reform. In fact, after resigning as
Superintendent, David Hornbeck spearheaded an
advocacy group, Good Schools Pennsylvania, which
is organizing in support of new state policies.
96

“Quality counts 2001: A better balance: Standards,
tests, and the tools to succeed,” Education Week
(January 2001). States were graded according to
their contribution to equalizing funding across all
school districts in the state.
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beginning of the reform described failed
attempts to build a bridge to Harrisburg:
I went to Harrisburg to talk to Governor
Ridge. The message that I was trying to get
across to the state was, “We know that the
District is not perfect. But we have a man
running it today who is most unusual
because he believes that he can fix it. This
is an incredible asset for you. What do we
have to do to link arms with you?”
Honestly, Ridge believes that you can’t fix
the Philadelphia public school district. He’d
rather skirt it by building an alternative
system. In defense of Ridge, even if he had
wanted to support Philadelphia schools, he
might not have been able to politically
because of opposition in the House of
97
Representatives.
A turning point in the relationship between
the District and the city occurred in 1997
when District leaders, Mayor Rendell and
City Council President Street, jointly
distributed a white paper titled, “Realities
Converge: This Year is Different.” The
paper outlined a pending fiscal crisis. It
explained that the years of insufficient
funding by the state and cost cutting by
the District had reached a point where
there were essentially no further ways to
cut corners without cutting deeply into
important programs. The language in the
white paper was strong:
The School District does not take these
actions lightly. Yet, Philadelphia’s children
deserve better treatment from the
state…The state’s continued denial of its
basic constitutional responsibility simply
leaves no alternative. The indisputable fact
is that the Commonwealth has denied its
moral and constitutional mandate to
provide a thorough and efficient education
98
to the city’s school children…
97

This paper set a new tone in the fight for
funding; it made school funding a moral
matter and laid the blame for inadequate
resources for Philadelphia’s children at the
feet of the state. Later, speeches by the
Superintendent escalated an already
charged environment with the accusation
that state funding policy was “racist.” The
District’s white paper and subsequent
rhetoric by Hornbeck enraged the
Governor and other state leaders.
David didn’t help himself with this process.
I don’t know if he could have been
politically counseled successfully or not. He
got himself in the crosshairs as a big part of
this issue, and no leader can afford that.
They absolutely hated him in Harrisburg.
And that’s not too strong a word. I heard
people in Harrisburg say “so long as that
guy’s there, you’ll never get a dime.” Any
contribution from the state would involve
99
his departure.
As this participant suggests, the battle for
funding became an increasingly personal
one, fought between the Superintendent
and state leaders. One result of this
personalized struggle was that the reform
effort became still further identified as the
effort of an individual — David Hornbeck.
The Superintendent repeatedly asserted
that he had the full support of Mayor
Rendell and then-City Council President
John Street in the fight for increased state
funding. They initially made a public show
of support, but in truth, Rendell was a
largely “silent partner” throughout his
administration. One civic leader noted,
“Frankly there were years when Ed Rendell
didn’t even mention schools in his State of
100
the City address.”
The Governor and legislative leadership
were adamant in their refusal to alter the
school funding formula or provide the

Business leader, August 2000.
99

Business leader, August 2000.
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School District of Philadelphia, Realities converge:
This year is different. Philadelphia: Author, 1997.
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Philadelphia Daily News (2000, August 24).
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money requested. They believed that the
District used existing funding inefficiently,
that the District’s teacher contract was a
major obstacle to improvement, and that
the city needed to provide a larger share of
school costs. The District argued that
Children Achieving had not been costly
and that the District had in fact taken
significant steps to cut administrative
spending. Overall costs had increased
because student enrollment had grown,
special education costs had gone up, and
charter schools were a drain on District
101
funds. Although the state did provide
Philadelphia with some one-time grants,
these were small in comparison to what
District leaders insisted was required to
continue with the Children Achieving
reform agenda.
Additionally, the Governor had quite
different views on what it would take to
improve Philadelphia schools. He believed
that vouchers and charter schools were the
remedy. Repeatedly frustrated in his
attempts to get a school voucher bill
through the legislature, Governor Ridge
looked for other ways to bring market
solutions to bear on the ills of public
schooling. (See Sidebar 3 on page 28 for a
discussion of the Governor Ridge’s plan for
school choice.)
When Superintendent Hornbeck
threatened to adopt an unbalanced budget
in the spring of 1999 and to close the
schools early, the state responded with Act
46, a draconian bill aimed directly at
Philadelphia. It allowed the state to take
over the District if Hornbeck pursued his
102
threat. Rather than cutting the proposed
101

School District of Philadelphia, Financial update.
Philadelphia: Author, 2001.

102

All the unions opposed this bill, but it passed
easily despite its numerous incendiary features, such
as provisions for replacing the School Board and
superintendent, suspending the teachers’ contract,
laying off teachers, and, in the words of the PaFT,
“unilateral school closings and privatization by
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school budget, Philadelphia leaders
persuaded two local banks to issue the
District letters of credit enabling it to
borrow $250 million to keep operating
103
through June 1999. Philadelphians had
taken notice of public education, and the
city’s schools were a key issue in the
mayoral primaries and election, as noted in
the Philadelphia Inquirer:
In a departure from past mayoral
campaigns, when the schools barely rated a
mention, this year’s crop of candidates is
talking often and avidly about public
education. And in keeping with the
national trend, many of the prescriptions
center on changing how the school system
104
is run and financed.
In November 1999, the citizens of
Philadelphia elected a new mayor,
Democrat John Street, who voiced support
for Superintendent Hornbeck and his
Children Achieving reforms. They also
approved a change to the City Charter,
which allowed the new Mayor to appoint all
of the Board of Education members
105
concurrently with his term of office. In
converting public schools to charter schools without
approval by teachers and parents.” (As quoted in the
Wall Street Journal, 1998, May 15). The strong
support for this bill reflected the legislature’s
negative view of Philadelphia as an insatiable and
“bottomless pit,” as well as their antipathy toward
the unions and Philadelphia's school superintendent.
103

K.A. White, “Philadelphia budget passes, easing
takeover threat,” Education Week (1998, June 10), p.
6.
104

D. Mezzacappa and S. Snyder, “Candidates agree:
Mayor’s control of school board should increase,”
Philadelphia Inquirer (1998, May 13).
105

The mayoral race was very close. Street’s main
opposition was from Republican Sam Katz, a
government finance consultant. Both candidates said
that public education would be a top priority in their
administration, but they had very different visions for
how to improve the schools. Katz called for the
removal of Hornbeck and looked to school choice
reforms — vouchers and charter schools — as the
only solutions for the struggling school system. In an
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addition, Mayor Street appointed Debra
Kahn as the city’s first Secretary of
Education to focus entirely on education
issues.
In his first year, Mayor Street made
education a top priority and took a
conciliatory stance toward state leaders.
One new Board member hailed a new era
in the District-state relationship, “We must
go to the state as a united front and
106
humbly.” While Street proclaimed that
David Hornbeck was his choice for
Superintendent and that Children
Achieving was the right reform plan for
Philadelphia, the Mayor’s actions signaled
to some that he was ready for a change. As
one union leader put it, “Street loved
107
Hornbeck to death.” And a District
administrator said:
Mayor Street wanted a new strategy for
handling the politics of public education.
David Hornbeck was confrontational and
the Mayor wanted something different. He
and his Secretary of Education and the
President of the Board decided to look for
a CEO-type to deal with the political and
108
financial stuff.
The political impasse between the District
and the state came to a head again in the
spring of 2000 when the District faced a
budget deficit of $205 million. Under
pressure from the state takeover law to
balance the budget, the Philadelphia Board
of Education made cuts and adopted a
budget of nearly $1.6 billion which
contained no new money for the programs
the Superintendent felt were required to

fully implement the Children Achieving
reform agenda. As a result, the
implementation of new promotion and
graduation requirements was postponed
and the number of days allocated for
teacher professional development was
reduced. Not willing to remain to oversee
the piece-by-piece dismantling of his
reform agenda, Superintendent Hornbeck
announced his resignation on June 5, 2000.
Ultimately, Mayor Street’s conciliatory
approach, which included suspending a
federal lawsuit charging that the state’s
funding formula was discriminatory, failed
to win increased state dollars. Governor
Ridge and his successor, Governor Mark
109
Schweiker, were steadfast in their
insistence that the state would not provide
more money without direct control over
the schools.
The struggle between state and city
leaders over financing the schools drained
enormous time and energy from the hard
work of instructional improvement, as
District staff calculated and re-calculated
what it would cost to fully fund the reform
plan and provide Philadelphia students
with sufficient opportunities to learn.
Superintendent Hornbeck’s passionate and
shrill rhetoric made him the lightning rod of
public debate. Other civic leaders were
divided over what strategy to pursue and
were reluctant to antagonize the Governor.
The community did not unite around a
strategy to achieve fairer funding for the
city’s schools.

ironic twist, Katz was appointed Executive Director of
Greater Philadelphia First soon after the mayoral
election and has since pushed for school choice
reforms coupled with increased state funding from
his position there.
106

School Board member, January 2000.
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Labor leader, October 2000.

108

School District leader, February 2001.

Schweiker assumed office when Ridge was drafted
by President Bush to become Director of Homeland
Security after the September 11, 2001 terrorist
attacks.
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STRATEGY 4: BUILD A
COALITION OF SUPPORT
AMONG BUSINESS ELITES
In the early years of the reform, GPF
leaders championed Children Achieving
and its leadership. This help was crucial to
the Superintendent at a time when the
Philadelphia Daily News, some of the city’s
political leaders, and the teachers’ union
were offering harsh criticism of the
Superintendent and his plan. By June 1996,
18 months after receiving the Annenberg
grant, the Children Achieving Challenge
had raised more than 90 percent of the
required $100 million match —
110
outdistancing all other Annenberg sites.
In the summer of 1996, business and civic
leaders purchased space on the editorial
page of the Philadelphia Inquirer to ask the
community to come together in support of
Hornbeck’s reform agenda and stay the
course with Children Achieving. The
Children Achieving Challenge, in
partnership with the Greater Philadelphia
Urban Affairs Coalition, also funded a
widespread public information campaign
called the Philadelphia Campaign for Public
111
Education.
110

Consortium for Policy Research in Education,
Research for Action, and the OMG Center for
Collaborative Learning, A first-year evaluation report
of Children Achieving.
111

Between 1995 and 1998, the Campaign, funded
by the Pew Charitable Trusts, worked to “sell” the
reform agenda. It published fliers and newsletters
that gave clear explanations of Children Achieving's
components. It led print, radio, and television
advertising campaigns that initially gave information
about SAT-9 testing, standards, full-day
kindergarten, and school-to-career programs and
later heralded the District’s success in improving test
scores, reducing bureaucracy, and setting tougher
standards, among other topics. The campaign also
worked to support the public engagement efforts of
other organizations by working with those
organizations on several events, including: Don’t
Miss the Bus Tours, which brought hundreds of city
and suburban elected officials, business leaders,
community leaders, parents, and citizens into schools
to see the impact of the reform on individual schools;
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But the District-PFT contract negotiations
of 1996 marked a turning point in
Superintendent Hornbeck’s relations with
GPF leaders. GPF leaders were extremely
disappointed that School District officials
did not extract major concessions from the
teachers’ union. While they understood
that Mayor Rendell was as culpable as the
Superintendent for the contract, business
leaders directed their anger at the
Superintendent and began to withdraw
their support for the District’s reform
agenda. A regional CEO and member of
the Children Achieving Challenge
Oversight Committee explained the
perspective shared by numerous corporate
leaders:
Hornbeck and [David] Cohen [Chief-of-Staff
during Rendell’s first term and a lead city
negotiator in the PFT talks] promised us
they were going to negotiate some
changes. They made a commitment and on
the strength of that promise, the business
community raised the match for
Annenberg. We kept our end of the
bargain but they didn’t. We wanted the
right to assign people to schools without
going by seniority, the right to make hiring
decisions at the school level, some control
over how prep time is used, and several
112
other changes but we got none of them.
Corporate leaders’ disillusionment with
Hornbeck also grew as they perceived that
the District was not satisfying the priorities
of the business community — efficient
financial management and growth of
business opportunities. Corporate leaders
rallies in Harrisburg to advocate for equitable
funding; Kindergarten Read-in Days, in which
celebrities, elected officials, local business and
community leaders, and community members read
their favorite stories to kindergarteners around the
city; charter school forum, which was designed to
explain what charter schools were to a lay audience.
These events contributed to giving Children
Achieving a greater presence in the local media and
also increased public awareness of the reform effort.
112

Business leader, August 2000.
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were frustrated in their attempts to get
reform leaders to outsource a greater
number of the District’s service contracts to
private companies. They believed that the
Superintendent was on board with this
idea, but his inaction in this area fueled the
more conservative GPF leaders’ perception
that the District was inefficient and not a
good steward of public funds.
Business leaders were also furious with
Hornbeck for his confrontational style,
which they saw as an inappropriate
strategy for securing public support and
state cooperation. Two business leaders
described their reactions to Superintendent
Hornbeck’s rhetoric about the state
funding policies and state leaders:
I was also upset about how David handled
the politics. The business community felt
that he was a good educator but a terrible
politician. He offended people. He
intentionally irritated them. He was hired to
be an educator, not a preacher. I know he
has a doctorate in theology but his
sermons were misplaced…So the state
wouldn’t talk to him at all and we couldn’t
resolve the District’s problems without
113
their help.
Yes, and he could have gotten it if he’d
been a better politician or stayed out of
politics. He could have gotten it if he’d
given up more for vouchers. He alienated
the Catholic school system. I believe in
bringing everyone into the tent and not
kicking anyone out, and David didn’t do
that…We depend on Harrisburg, and we
won’t get anything if we tell them they’re
stupid, ugly, and wrong…David should
have said, “Look, we both want
accountability” and worked from common
114
ground.
A Children Achieving Challenge staff
member described the shift in the business
113

community’s stance toward Children
Achieving:
The corporate community at the beginning,
and along the way, had competing
interests. I think that there was a struggle
between the educational issues they knew
to be critical to the city’s long-term health
and their own economic health. On the one
hand, they wanted to support an
accountability, standards-driven agenda.
There was also support for the Governor —
his economic stance and his educational
agenda. The Governor’s commitment to
economic development is pretty solid, from
the business community’s perspective. It
was a constant tug of war. Later, David’s
personality made even more of a difference
for them [corporate leaders]. I watched the
scale start to tip, and split the business
community. Being inside, I saw where it
115
came from, even if I didn’t like it.
Midway through Hornbeck’s tenure as
Superintendent, board leadership at GPF
changed and took a more conservative
turn. Changes in the regional and national
economic picture were transforming the
nature of business leadership in
Philadelphia. Many local corporations (e.g.,
CoreStates Bank, Scott Paper, SmithKline,
and others) were taken over by companies
based outside of Philadelphia, which
lessened the commitment of business
leadership to the well-being of the city. In
addition, city leaders were increasingly
interested in partnering with regional
leaders to address mutual areas of concern,
and GPF had expanded its membership
base to include regional corporations. This
meant that the organization now
represented suburban as well as urban
interests. By June 2000, when
Superintendent Hornbeck resigned, only
four of Greater Philadelphia First’s
founding 23 CEOs remained. These shifts
in the city’s economic life served to isolate

Business leader, August 2000.
115

114

Business leader, November 2000.

Children Achieving Challenge staff, October 2000.
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corporate leaders from other sectors of
116
Philadelphia’s civic community.
A funder of reform described the shift:
What happened was a rapid transformation
from businesses led by Philly people to
businesses without a vested interest in
Philadelphia, or an understanding of the
117
city.
Several participants contrasted the new
corporate leadership to what had
previously existed. One explained:
David believed you could make a social
contract with the business community, but
he looked up and they were gone. I don’t
think the corporate community is playing a
healthy, visible constructive role in public
education. But they carry tremendous
weight. It’s a combination of factors. So
few businesses are local now. And there
are some leaders who came through the
Archdiocese system. They want to keep
118
taxes down and have vouchers.
Business leaders insisted that it was the
Superintendent’s inflammatory rhetoric
about state leaders and their role in the
state’s sorry school funding policies that
pushed them out of the fold. Many were
strong supporters of the Archdiocese
system and were attracted to Governor
Ridge’s proposal for vouchers which they
believed would be good for business by
stemming the flow of middle- and workingclass families from the city, thereby
buoying the local economy and
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strengthening the quality of the workforce.
They tried to persuade Superintendent
Hornbeck to work with the Governor on
this issue.
Early on, we tried to talk David into giving
the Governor his voucher plan. He would
have taken that card away and could have
moved the discussion since we’d still have
a tremendous number of kids to educate.
The reality is that the voucher kids don’t
perform any better, but their parents feel
better about the school. It’s really a
creaming process because the parents who
take advantage of vouchers are probably
already involved in their kid’s life.
Personally, I’m for vouchers, but it’s hard
when it’s a magic bullet by conservatives. I
want to implement it but not as a magic
bullet. As a magic bullet, I’m not certain
that it really helps the 10,000 who get
119
vouchers.
Civic and community leaders that we
interviewed were disheartened by the
behavior of the corporate community. One
explained that business leaders’ orientation
made it difficult for them to be patient and
persist in the face of serious social
problems:
The business community thinks short term.
They think in terms of quarters — the
furthest into the future they might look is
two years. They pulled back because there
120
were not results soon enough.
Others were harsher in their assessment of
the business community’s role.

116

The relative isolation of the business community
from other civic leadership was confirmed by our
network analysis of participants’ sources of
information about public education. This analysis
showed that business leaders received their
information from the newspapers and the
Superintendent and were highly unlikely to interact
with members of other stakeholder groups about
public education issues.

Right now this corporate community gets
off the hook. It skates. It’s having too good
a party right now. Maybe when Wall Street
crashes, they’ll realize what’s going on. It
stands to lose eventually. We’ve allowed
the development of ways for the education

117

Civic leader, October 2000.
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Business leader, July 2000.
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Civic leader, May 2000.

120

Former School Board member, October 2000.
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FIGURE 4. SOURCES OF INFORMATION ABOUT THE PHILADELPHIA PUBLIC SCHOOLS
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of the labor force to come from elsewhere
and government brokers for corporate
121
interests.
One of the questions that we asked
interviewees was, “Where do you get your
most reliable source of information about
the School District of Philadelphia?” Figure
4 depicts the strength of the lines of
communication among the sectors included
in our research. The School District played
the primary role in providing interviewees
with information about the District and its
schools. The media and community
organizations also played important roles in
121

Civic leader, May 2000.

providing the interviewees with
information. There was moderate-strong
reciprocal communication among the
District, foundations, community
organizations, and the media. Labor and
business were the most isolated sectors;
the information they received was from a
very limited number of sectors, and
likewise, they provided information to a
limited number.
As this discussion has shown, business and
civic leaders were initially drawn to the
major ideas of the reform — particularly
accountability — and the charisma of the
new Superintendent. Despite efforts to
engage civic and business elites in the
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reform, the business community’s support
for District leadership and the reform plan
declined precipitously and business leaders
became increasingly isolated from other
civic leaders.

STRATEGY 5: BUILD A
GRASSROOTS MOVEMENT OF
PARENTS AND COMMUNITY
MEMBERS
The Children Achieving plan articulated a
new vision for the role of parents in public
education. In another report in this series,
on parents’ roles in Children Achieving, the
authors explain that reform leaders saw
“parents as critical players in school
122
reform.” They envisioned parents as
collaborators in reform and, in doing so,
moved away from other approaches to
involving parents either as clients to be
served by schools or as consumers who
‘buy’ the best product (or school). This
vision of positioning parents as partners in
reform fit with the reform’s emphasis on
accountability. In addition to engaging
parents in the process of improving
schools, it emphasized parents’ roles in
holding schools, and District, city, and state
officials accountable for the quality of
public education.
Reform leaders also looked to parents’ new
roles as a strategy for building support for
Children Achieving and building a lobbying
campaign to press city and state
government leaders for increased funding
for Philadelphia’s schools. Developing a
strong base of parents and community
members who would participate in and
advocate for Children Achieving was seen
as an important strategy to create local

support for the reform agenda, which
would improve the chances of increased
city and state funding.
But there are many barriers to involving
parents in schools and our participants
were well versed in the obstacles:
We’ve also got to do more to mobilize
parents. We need to help schools be more
inclusive. You can do all the mobilizing in
the world, but if they’re not inclusive, you
do more harm than good. There is a
struggle around the notion of community
involvement, what that means, how the
district and schools can work with
123
parents.
We have to get parents involved. This is
hard. They are afraid to come to school.
They have bad memories of school. Many
failed themselves. Some can’t read. They
don’t know how to be advocates for their
own children. But we have to get them
124
involved in their children’s education.
Many participants recognized that
educational improvement was unlikely
without a public clamor for change, and
that parents were key to that outcry:
My main criticism about Children Achieving
is that you can’t do this kind of reform
without more widespread support. There
needs to be a demand for it. There are
other parents and community leaders who
could support the agenda more strongly,
but I don’t think the District tried to
engage those people and it cost them in
125
the end.
The reform’s design and implementation
included numerous components aimed at
operationalizing the goal of parents as
partners in reform. These included: the
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E. Gold, A. Rhodes, S. Brown, S. Lytle, and D.
Waff, Clients, consumers, or collaborators? Parents
and their roles in school reform during Children
Achieving, 1995-2000. Philadelphia: Consortium for
Policy Research in Education, University of
Pennsylvania, 2001, p. 1.
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inclusion of parents in activities and
decision-making previously reserved for
education professionals, the establishment
of local school councils, the creation of a
parent-organizing organization
independent of the District, and a more
open policy in the reporting of data about
student outcomes.
Children Achieving began with a lot of
promise for including parents in new ways.
In 1995, parents and educators came
together to develop the academic
standards for what students should know
and be able to do in different subjects and
grade levels. Turning the development of
standards over to teachers, parents, and
community members was an important
decision early in the reform effort. It
signaled that reform would be a public
endeavor and that educators were not the
only stakeholders who had important
knowledge about what students should
know and be able to do. But in hindsight,
reform leaders believed that the effort did
not result in the grassroots buy-in hoped
for:
There was a lot of energy put into the
process. But at the time, we didn’t see that
the people who had developed the
standards could be advocates and
champions for them with other parents and
teachers. That was a missed opportunity on
our part. We thought we had done enough
126
just to have them locally developed.
We ended up allowing the public to shape
the standards in an attempt to engage
them with the reform. But in the end,
giving the community control of standards
127
didn’t increase ownership.
As these participants describe, involving
parents and community members in
developing academic standards gave them
126

Civic leader, 1998.

127

Children Achieving Challenge staff, October 2000.

a brief opportunity to voice their opinions
and have an important hand in shaping the
reform. It did not, however, result in a
lasting base of parent and community
leadership.
Another promising element of the reform
was the establishment of local school
councils (LSCs), composed of parents,
teachers, and a school’s principal, which
would have broad authority at the school
level over policy matters, including budget
allocation, safety and security measures,
and facilities operation and management.
The councils, which were designed to have
an equal representation of parents and
teachers, would give parents a new,
decision-making role in schools. While the
local school councils held potential for
parents and community members, parents’
roles on the councils were quickly limited
when the PFT pushed for, and won, a 51
percent majority of teachers on the
councils. Further, schools had difficulties
putting local school councils in place. In
order for a school council to be certified
(and thus recognized by the District), one
adult from at least 35 percent of student
households had to participate in the
election of parent representatives. This
proved too difficult for most schools.
Some of those schools created uncertified
school councils, but these lacked the
authority and decision-making power
afforded to councils recognized by the
District. Several of our participants
believed that District leaders did not go far
enough in creating the conditions that
would bring authentic parent and
community involvement through local
school councils:
David [Hornbeck] wasn’t radical. He was
reformist. Part of his plan was to have a
community impact in schools through
school councils but in all the time that he
was in Philadelphia, he didn’t get LSCs in
even 50 percent of schools. If that had
really happened, and parents had been
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given real authority, then that would have
128
been radical.
Local decision-making and LSCs never got
off the ground. I’m not sure how many
“real” school councils there are — that is,
how many are actually participatory bodies.
129
I would like to see more of that.
Gold, Rhodes, Brown, Lytle, and Waff
describe the challenges of forming
legitimate local school councils:
The reform did not take account of how
deeply unsettling the shift of power among
schools, parents, and community would be
to many principals and teachers. Reform
planners underestimated what it would
take for schools, especially in low-income,
racially-isolated neighborhoods, to turn
themselves around and work with parents
130
as collaborators in school reform.
A third promising element for creating new
roles for parents in reform was the creation
of the Alliance Organizing Project (AOP), a
new organization devoted to building
parent leadership. When the AOP was
formed, Philadelphia was already home to
a number of community-based efforts to
improve schools, both on a neighborhood
level and citywide.
Concerned about the lack of parent and
community involvement in previous
education reform efforts, the leaders of
several education advocacy organizations
formed the AOP, with funding and support
from the Children Achieving Challenge.
The AOP’s mission — supporting a cadre
of community organizers who would
develop parent leadership teams in schools
131
across the District, matched
128

Former School Board member, October 2000.
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Civic leader, October 2000.

Superintendent Hornbeck’s vision of
including community organizing as a
component of Children Achieving. As a
result, the AOP was included in the
Children Achieving Action Design. Despite
this connection to the reform effort, the
AOP maintained an independence from the
Challenge as its mission and direction were
set by an independent board of directors.
The AOP’s organizing efforts were never as
far-reaching as intended. The organization
planned to have organizers in all 22
clusters, but in reality, only became
established in 12 clusters, with active
parent teams in 30 schools. The new roles
that AOP intended to create for parents
met significant resistance from principals
and other advocacy organizations, which
limited AOP’s outreach efforts and support
within the District. As Gold, Rhodes,
Brown, Lytle, and Waff describe:
Neither Hornbeck nor others in the central
office anticipated the resistance from local
schools, especially among principals, that
AOP organizers would meet as they
prepared parents and community members
to become co-leaders in education
reform…A number of principals jumped to
the conclusion early in the effort that AOP
was adversarial and would blame them for
their children’s educational problems.
These principals made it difficult and
sometimes impossible for an AOP
132
organizer to work in their schools.
Principals’ resistance was made plain when
the Commonwealth Association of
School Administrators, the principals’
union, made the AOP an issue in contract
131

See Gold, Rhodes, Brown, Lytle, and Waff, Clients,
consumers, or collaborators? for a complete
description of AOP and where it fit into Children
Achieving’s efforts to involve parents in the reform
effort, as well as a case study of AOP’s work in one
school.
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negotiations and Hornbeck agreed that
having the AOP at individual schools would
be left up to principals’ discretion. It was
not only school administrators, however,
who resisted the AOP’s presence in
Philadelphia’s schools. Some advocacy
organizations, too, feared that the AOP
would usurp their work with parents, and
the fact that it was funded through the
Children Achieving Challenge encouraged
133
these fears.
This resistance to the AOP led reform
leaders at the Challenge to decrease their
commitment to it, in favor of encouraging
all groups working with parents to work
together, regardless of their approach to
134
involving parents. Thus, although the
AOP played a vital role in engaging parents
in new ways in their schools, it did not
meet the reform leaders’ original vision for
a Districtwide community-organizing effort.
A fourth promising element for changing
the relationships between parents and
schools was an increased sharing of
information and data about student
achievement and school performance.
Reform leaders achieved this in part by
publishing the test scores of all schools
annually in the Philadelphia Inquirer and, in
later years, posting them on the School
District’s web site. In the first three years of
the reform, attempts to increase
information sharing were also
complemented by the Philadelphia
Campaign for Public Education’s
advertising campaigns. Civic leaders noted
the positive impact of these efforts:
Education is much more on people’s minds.
There used to be despair and no attention.
It is now widely understood that problems
need to be addressed. Also, there is more

open sharing of data and we can look at
135
where schools are working.
Participants also had reservations, however,
about the real meaning of the data that
was shared and how parents and
community members could use it, echoing
many of the concerns around test scores
that civic leaders described earlier:
It seems that scores may go up but the
school is still in the toilet in terms of its
climate, and the instruction, and what kids
are really learning. My hope is that the
progress on scores is not a technical point.
But change has not been dramatic enough
for parents to have confidence in what’s
136
going on.
Thus, while participants applauded the
School District’s openness with information
about student performance and many
parents and community members did
become more informed about their
schools’ performance during Children
Achieving, this information sharing did not
always translate to increased support for
the reform effort. While reform leaders’
efforts to share information about test
scores may not have significantly changed
parents’ roles in schools, they did create a
system that was more open to critique and
input from the community.
Reform leaders’ strategies for building a
grassroots movement of parents and
community members who could advocate
for the reform both locally and in
Harrisburg fell short of their expectations
for many reasons including: skeptical
school administrators, divisions within the
advocacy community, a lack of necessary
supports to fully implement structures such
as local school councils or organizations
such as the AOP, and, above all, a
misjudging of the deep cultural changes
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that were needed to build a grassroots
movement and a misguided strategy for
orchestrating it from above and inside the
District. Reform leaders’ commitment to
creating new roles for parents in schools
and school reform faded when the efforts
did not result in large numbers of parents
who could go to Harrisburg to advocate for
137
increased funding.

STRATEGY 6: USE LEGAL
ACTION TO PUSH FOR
EQUITABLE FUNDING
A final strategy identified by reform leaders
was to seek increased funding from the
state through legal means. Since 1997, the
District, in partnership with the city and
community groups, has pursued two legal
actions against the state. The first was a
lawsuit in the Pennsylvania Commonwealth
Court that claimed the state had violated
its obligation under the state constitution
to provide a “thorough and efficient”
education for all children in Pennsylvania.
This case was similar to many school
finance lawsuits nationally. But in March
1998, a state court dismissed the case,
arguing that it was lawmakers and not the
court that must determine what constitutes
an adequate education for students as well
as how much money is needed to provide
for it. And unlike courts in other states, the
court did not order lawmakers to
determine a fiscal remedy to the state’s
funding system. Several of our informants
speculated that as long as state court
judges are elected, it is unlikely that the
Pennsylvania legal system would render a
decision that significantly altered how
public schools are financed.
The second legal action was a lawsuit,
Powell v. Ridge, filed in March 1998 in a
U.S. District Court by the District, city,
parents, students, and various advocacy
137
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groups. The suit argues that the state’s
funding system violates Title VI of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, which prohibits racial or
ethnic discrimination by entities receiving
federal funds. The plaintiffs contend that
the state’s funding practices discriminate
against school districts with large numbers
of non-White students; they cite spending
gaps between Philadelphia and suburban
districts as well as between school districts
with similar poverty levels but different
racial and ethnic compositions. This lawsuit
is still active, although it has been
suspended under agreements between
Mayor Street and then-Governor Ridge
since summer 2000.The city and the state
initially agreed to put the case on hold for
one year after the state agreed to
additional funding for the District for the
2000-2001 school year. The suspension
date was extended for 90 days on July 30,
2001 in a Memorandum of Understanding
138
signed by the city, state, and District.
These lawsuits served to formalize the
District and city’s united front in the fight
for equitable funding. However, they also
caused deeper divides in the District’s
relationship with state leaders and those
divides, as we have described, led to
decreased support from business leaders.
The state court’s rejection of the school
finance lawsuit made visible the battle
between state and city and marked a
turning point for District-city relations. The
civil-rights lawsuit has been particularly
offensive to leaders in Harrisburg because
of the race-related charges it makes and
also because, as a federal suit, it poses a
more serious threat.
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The deadlines originally set in the Memorandum of
Understanding were extended until the end of
November 2001; it is unclear whether the lawsuit’s
suspension was included in that postponement.
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THE MISSING STRATEGY:
ENGAGE FRONTLINE
EDUCATORS
The School District’s relationships with its
professional unions, the Philadelphia
Federation of Teachers and the
Commonwealth Association of School
Administrators (CASA), were contentious
over the course of Children Achieving.
It seems like from the beginning of David
Hornbeck’s reform efforts, the teachers
haven’t been on board. I’m not sure why,
but the teachers’ union is very powerful,
and more often an instrument against
change rather than for it. The District has to
139
overcome that in order to make progress.
Like the PFT — you want to get their
support, get them to support something
even if it’s not the whole agenda. I haven’t
met a teacher that has good things to say
about Hornbeck, which is a shame. These
are relationships that could have been
140
developed.
Both the PFT and CASA offered strong
objections to key components of Children
Achieving, particularly to its accountability
provisions. Tensions were highest when the
District leaders attempted to reconstitute
two high schools, plans which were
ultimately halted by an independent
arbitrator who ruled that the District had
failed to engage in the necessary
consultation with the PFT. PFT leaders
repeatedly questioned the alignment of the
SAT-9 assessment with the new District
standards and were furious that the District
never modified the formula for the
accountability index despite their own
protestations and the advice of an outside
accountability panel. They also criticized
the clusters as increased and unnecessary

bureaucracy, and argued that the money
would be better spent on early childhood
education, smaller classes, and a District
curriculum that would provide more
direction to teachers on what to teach.
Unlike their union leadership, who did not
utter a single positive comment about
Children Achieving or District leaders in
five years of interviewing, rank-and-file
teachers saw parts of the reform agenda as
very beneficial. More than 80 percent of
teachers believed that standards and small
learning communities had the potential to
have a positive impact on their students.
But District leaders were not able to
capitalize on this support. One reason was
that teachers felt that reform leaders were
dismissive of their hard work. Their
frustration began upon Superintendent
Hornbeck’s arrival.
David helped to make education a hot
agenda, but he didn’t give credit for what
had been going on before. That wasn’t
141
appropriate or humble.
Only four percent of teachers reported that
they felt respected by the Superintendent.
And this fact was not lost on many of our
interviewees who lamented the lack of
teacher engagement in the reform.
Can you act on the belief that all children
are capable of learning without a huge
team that is invested in the same way. It
feels as though we’ve come a long way,
but I do think that the failure is that there
are not enough professionals who think it’s
[Children Achieving] their plan. A high
school student intern was here last week
who told us that her science teacher said
she hates Superintendent Hornbeck. How
142
did we get to that?
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They decried the stance of both District
and union leaders toward frontline
educators.
The District needs to figure out how to
engage the good teachers. The
Superintendent ignored them. And the
District needs to make more of an effort to
get the PFT on board rather than write
them off. We’re now in a situation where
the PFT is disclaiming the progress on test
scores. It’s disclaiming the improvement
brought about by its own membership!
Hornbeck didn’t invent accountability or
reconstitution. When will the PFT realize
this is not going away? It’s a national
143
trend.
Not building the support for the program
was problematic. I think he tried, but he
could have done more. But then I don’t
think the business community or the PFT
144
tried to help either.
Teachers were also demoralized by a
central administration that they perceived
as out of touch with the reality of schools.
They were overwhelmed by demands of
the reform and its mandate to do so many
things at once.
The communication piece of CA [Children
Achieving] was always a source of
frustration for me. I think they went forward
way too fast for the internal audience to
buy in and support the reforms. As a result,
it took a lot longer for people to get it, and
there was a constant undertow of disregard
145
and disbelief.
Principals were even more alienated than
teachers. Alleging that the pay-forperformance system for school principals
was not objective, CASA brought suit
143

Media leader, January 2000.
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Children Achieving Challenge staff member,
August 2000.
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against the District. Mistrust of central
administration was so great that CASA
leaders would not agree to support a
survey of school principals as part of the
Children Achieving evaluation for fear that
its members would be sanctioned for their
responses. Foley summarized the situation:
Philadelphia leadership consistently
underestimated the importance of
developing and maintaining relationships
with these important stakeholders. They
discounted constituent perspectives,
experiences, and ultimately, their power to
hurt or help the School District. Other
districts considering systemic reform efforts
should work to collaborate with key
stakeholders whenever possible and, at
minimum, give respect to their
146
perspectives and experiences.

DISCUSSION
Superintendent Hornbeck knew that strong
public support was necessary to press for
and sustain the ambitious improvements he
hoped to make. But grossly inadequate
funding for public education in
Pennsylvania and economic stagnation in
the city created a harsh context for
coalition building. It pressed reform leaders
to show swift, measurable results to gain
public support and reinforced their
defensiveness about their efforts.
Superintendent Hornbeck’s all-or-nothing
approach, and the lack of broad public
discussion about the varied interpretations
of the reform’s intentions, both contributed
to the impermeable nature of the reform
effort and left people feeling they did not
have a role in developing or revising the
reform approach.
Strategies developed by city government
and District leaders to build support for the
reform and secure more funding from the
city and the state proved largely
146

Foley, Contradictions and control in systemic
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unsuccessful. Failure to take into account
historical strengths of the District and its
accomplishments alienated many teachers
and principals who might have, under
different circumstances, championed the
ideas of Children Achieving and led efforts
at implementation. And leaders of the
professional unions adopted an
obstructionist stance toward the reform at
its inception and became increasingly
isolated over the course of the reform.
While most civic and foundation leaders
continued to believe in the main principles
of the reform plan, they were frustrated by
Hornbeck’s alienation of frontline staff and
state government leaders. For many of
them, the man failed the ideas.
Urban regime theorists divide political
power into two spheres: private sector
economic elites and government officials.
In a capitalist economy, government
officials cannot generate public policy
without the cooperation of those who
control economic production. Partnerships
between the private sector and
government constitute governing
“regimes.” The degree to which these
regimes attend to social change and the
redistribution of resources to alleviate
poverty and its effects varies. It depends on
the degree to which corporate and
government leaders are engaged with
community groups that promote a social
justice agenda. Without interaction among
these sectors, private sector interests are
likely to dominate public policy.
Increasingly, state leaders have become
prominent in urban regimes, particularly
around education as urban school districts
are dependent on governors and state
legislators for funding and are governed by
state policies.
Over the course of the reform, the business
community became increasingly isolated
and alienated. Legal action against the
state only served to further alienate state
and business leaders and, given that state

court officials are elected, was unlikely to
yield a favorable ruling. Because
Philadelphia lacked strong and united
community organizations to advocate for
more funding, it was hard to persuade
business leaders that a redistribution of
resources was necessary if Children
Achieving was to reach its ambitious goal
of all students reaching high standards.

Civic Engagement and Urban School Improvement: Hard-to-Learn Lessons from Philadelphia

57

LESSONS FOR THE
FUTURE

alliances for reform. It discouraged critical
questions, reflection, and revision — all
necessary for organizational learning.

I

From the time of his arrival, Superintendent
Hornbeck faced difficult odds. Inadequate
school funding forced a leadership stance
of, “We have the best possible reform plan.
We are making and will continue to make
remarkable progress.” But selling systemic
reform on a grand scale contributed to
widespread disillusionment when common
sense didn’t deliver the results anticipated.
Many of the people we spoke with
expressed the feeling, “We’ve done the
best and the most that can be done; let the
state take over.”

think the ability to have a running
conversation about achievement for all
kids for four years running is a huge
accomplishment. I think that people
on the street have something to say about
the education crisis we’re facing…It gives
us something to build on, but we have to
147
remember that it takes a long time.
Our research shows how difficult it is to
build the resilient civic coalitions necessary
for improving urban schools, especially in
the harsh circumstances of inadequate
funding. David Hornbeck was an attractive
candidate for Philadelphia’s
superintendency. He brought star power as
a national educational reform figure, and a
passionate commitment to improving both
urban schools and the life chances of poor
students of color. He also had a strong
belief that his systemic approach to school
reform could turn around a poorly
performing urban school system. The
Children Achieving reform was adopted as
Hornbeck’s plan, but in its six years of
implementation, it never became a civic
undertaking; that is, an effort widely
understood and championed by business,
civic, and government elites, and frontline
educators who would work tirelessly for its
success.
Although Hornbeck’s approach to systemic
reform — the combination of standards,
accountability, and decentralization — was
being widely discussed in national
education policy circles for its potential, it
was not yet a proven theory of change. In
Philadelphia, the selling of systemic reform
as comprehensive common sense and as a
package that “all had to be done at once,”
undercut the possibility for the input and
accommodations necessary for building
147

Civic leader, August 2000.

There were missteps by reform leaders on
many fronts — all stemming from the
mistaken beliefs that a reform coalition
could be created around a fixed agenda
and that those who built the agenda should
make all the decisions from the center
about whether and how to change it. But
other stakeholder sectors also missed
opportunities to offer positive leadership.
For example, the business community was
ambivalent about its role in public
education and failed to lead an advocacy
effort for revisions to the state’s school
funding formula. Likewise, the Philadelphia
Federation of Teachers was reactive around
its self-interests and never engaged in a
constructive way around accountability and
changes in work rules — issues that had
and continue to have broad public support.
And the isolation of these two groups from
other sectors was an obstacle to coalition
building.

COMMON GROUND
Certainly, the six years of Children
Achieving were not for naught.
Philadelphians know more about what it
takes to improve schools than they did six
years ago. There is a better understanding
of the enormity of the problem and a
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stronger consensus around key ideas which
together could form the cornerstones for
future improvement strategies. Some of
these ideas are the direct legacy of
Children Achieving — a recognition of its
accomplishments. Others are the hard
lessons gleaned from the reform’s
disappointments. Current leaders need to
recognize this knowledge and use it to
shape strategies that have a chance at
gaining legitimacy in the community.
In order of frequency mentioned by our
interviewees, ideas for improving schools
included the following: (The number of
times the idea was mentioned appears in
parenthesis.)
•

Increase funding for the city’s schools
(35)

•

Build coalitions of support for
improving public education (27)

•

Improve the quality of the teaching
workforce (26)

•

Provide access to data about how
schools are faring as the foundation for
public accountability (24)

•

Set high standards for all students’
learning (24)

•

Continue full-day kindergarten and a
research-based approach to literacy in
the early grades (18)

•

Seek changes in the teachers contract
(18)

We elaborate these ideas below.
Increase funding for the city’s schools.
Interviewees believed that increased
funding was required to improve the
schools and student achievement. While
many acknowledged that there might be
inefficiencies in the District, they believed

that there were unavoidable costs to
ensuring that students had access to a
high-quality education. For example,
increased compensation for teachers and
intensive attention to early childhood
education were two budget items around
which there was wide agreement.
Coalition building. Our informants were
adamant about the need for coalitions, not
finger pointing. They recognized that
public engagement in schools increased
during Children Achieving:
Education is much more on people’s minds.
There used to be despair and no attention.
It is now widely understood that problems
148
need to be addressed.
There has been progress in building some
community support for education. People
are getting involved, and that is healthy.
David did a good job initially in mobilizing
the foundations and the business
community. He got them behind his
agenda. It was a big improvement over the
previous administration when we had to
149
fight to get a hearing.
However, they were weary of accusations
and counter-accusations. Most looked to
leadership from the Mayor and the
Governor to heal the political rifts and
move forward.
The number one thing is the need for a
citywide, if not region-wide, groundswell of
support that public education is important.
Improve the quality of the teaching
workforce. Teacher and principal quality
was very much on people’s minds and they
knew that it would take multiple steps to
address these issues including: stronger
recruitment strategies, increased

148
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compensation, and effective professional
development.
The emphasis on teacher development and
training has been really important. It’s so
critical to kids being able to do well. It’s the
teachers who are going to make a
150
difference at the individual level.
Those who worked closest to the reform
also named ways to improve professional
development. They emphasized a focus on
content and sustained professional
development that followed teachers into
their classrooms. But interviewees who
were more distanced from schools had
little concept of the intensity of training
necessary to strengthen classroom
instruction. Reform leaders need to be
aware of this and develop strategies that
will encourage big investments in
professional learning and patience about
their effects.
Provide access to data about how schools
are faring as the foundation for public
accountability. Informants applauded
District leaders for being forthcoming with
data about schools’ performance.
The emphasis on monitoring the
achievement of kids, and being open about
the information needs to be continued.
With Connie Clayton, they obscured it.
David’s actually holding himself up and
holding the Philadelphia School District up
151
for review.
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Set high standards for all students’
learning. Informants remained supportive
of the idea of standards.
Certainly having the goal that you can
produce world-class education in a student
152
generation needs to be out there.
However, our research points to the need
for discussions about what standards are
and how they are manifest in the reform’s
approach.
Continue full-day kindergarten and a
research-based approach to literacy in
the early grades. A number of our
respondents believed that Children
Achieving had brought important changes
in the educational experiences of
significant numbers of the system’s
youngest students. They pointed to the
establishment of full-day kindergarten and
the attention to literacy in the early grades
where there were also reductions in class
size as offering a whole generation of
youngsters a strong start in school.
There are children whose lives have been
changed forever. If you were a child
entering kindergarten five years ago,
chances are that you’re a better reader.
There were maybe 100,000 kids who were
positively impacted by full-day
kindergarten reduced class size. You can
really only judge the benefits and the
progress by looking at those kids. The
reform was intended to take a full
153
generation of children to really take root.

The public will be watching to ascertain
how open new leaders are to scrutiny. Will
data be readily available in ways that allow
comparison across reform approaches?
Will researchers, parents, and community
members have access to schools to
observe the quality of educational
programs?

Seek changes in the teacher contract.
Informants believed that there needed to
be significant changes to the teacher
contract. One government leader
summarized the opinions of most of our
interviewees.
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I think we have to make some radical
changes to the teachers’ contract if we’re
going to get any real changes. We need to
change the contract provisions around
hiring, transfer, and assignment so that our
schools with the highest poverty aren’t
penalized. Also, I believe principals when
they complain that they are held
accountable and can’t hire their own
154
staff.

LESSONS ABOUT COALITION
BUILDING
Educational reforms often falter in the
absence of strong public engagement.
Understanding the reform strategy that
preceded state takeover, how it contrasted
with other approaches to improving public
education, how it was understood by
community leaders, and how they assessed
its accomplishments and failures offers
important information to the School
Reform Commission as it deliberates the
future of public education and seeks to
build public support for its plan. As they
craft new plans for Philadelphia schools
and seek support for the hard work of
sustained educational improvement, it’s
imperative that they heed the past. In
addition to the strategies identified above
by our interviewees, we offer the following
lessons gleaned from our research on the
Children Achieving reform:
Capitalize on strengths and prior
accomplishments. It’s tempting to
condemn all that has gone before as a way
to build support for change. This is why the
baby is so often thrown out with the bath
water in educational reform. But, starting
from scratch wastes time and talent,
ignores what has been shown to be
effective, alienates the good educators
who were responsible for prior
accomplishments and could be leaders in
the next phase of reform, and increases
154

Government leader, March 2000.

public cynicism about educational reform
and its leaders.
Openly discuss competing reform ideas.
Public dialogue about proposals for
improving schools is central to building the
public will necessary for the long haul.
Educators need to adequately explain what
they’re doing and why. Leaders and
ordinary citizens need to understand and
be able to talk about different reform
strategies and theories of action. They
need to delve beneath education jargon to
explore various interpretations of ideas.
Only then will the city be able to have a
productive dialogue about what will work
in its schools. It is during such
conversations that various sectors of the
community can understand one another’s
perspectives, find common ground, and
move forward.
Seek feedback about plans to improve
schools and listen to what others have to
say. As plans go forward, discuss their
progress, reflect openly on
accomplishments and challenges, seek
input, make mid-course corrections, and
explain them. An informed public is more
likely to be supportive and to sustain their
support over time.
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APPENDIX A. RESEARCH
METHODS
A research team conducted 42 interviews
of civic elites between January 2000 and
155
January 2001. Interviewees were leaders
from 10 sectors: civic institutions, current
and former School Board members,
businesses, foundations, District leaders,
Children Achieving Challenge staff, higher
education, media, government, and labor.
(School Board members were also leaders
in other sectors.)
The research team chose interviewees
according to several criteria:
•

Leadership in an institution that was
involved in Philadelphia public
education and/or leadership in one of
the 10 sectors identified as important
to represent;

•

Knowledge of the Children Achieving
reform; and

•

Identification by other interviewees as
an important source of information to
them or as having an important/
interesting perspective on public
education.

Interviews were semi-structured and
generally took about one hour. The
interview protocol was designed to elicit
perspectives of the interviewees on the
following topics:
•

Public schools in the larger social,
economic, and political context of the
city;

•

Sources of information on how the
schools are doing;

155

Our protocol was based on that used by Shipps,
Sconzert, and Swyers in their evaluation of the
Chicago Annenberg Challenge (see footnote 51).

•

Understanding of the Children
Achieving reform plan;

•

Assessment of the District’s progress
during the reform effort and what
accounted for that progress or lack of
progress; and

•

Prognosis for public schools.
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The majority of interviews occurred during
two time periods, one between January
and April 2000, and the other between
August and October 2000. Because the
School District was at different moments of
transition and uncertainty during most of
the interviews, we also asked informants for
their perspectives on the most recent
events affecting the schools. These events
included:
•

January 2000. John Street’s
inauguration as Mayor and his
appointment of a new School Board;

•

June 2000. Superintendent David
Hornbeck’s resignation;

•

August 2000. Threatened teachers’
strike; and

•

August-October 2000. New leadership
structure for the central office,
including the appointment of a Chief
Education Officer and a Chief
Academic Officer.

Secondary data sources included literature
reviews, documents from the Children
Achieving Challenge, and articles from
local newspaper archives. Additionally, the
research for this report occurred within the
larger context of the five-year, multimethod evaluation of the Children
Achieving Challenge. We drew heavily from
insights gained from hundreds of
interviews and observations in central and
cluster offices and schools to make sense
of the data collected for this report.
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Number of
Interviews

Male

Female

White

African
American

Latino

Asian

Leaders of Civic
Institutions

9
(20.0%)

5

4

5

4

-

-

Current/Former School
Board Members

7
(15.6%)

5

2

2

4

1

-

Business Leaders

5
(11.1%)

5

-

5

-

-

-

School District
Employees/Leaders

5
(11.1%)

1

4

4

1

-

-

Foundation Staff

4
(8.9%)

2

2

3

1

-

-

Children Achieving
Challenge Staff

4
(8.9%)

1

3

3

-

-

1

Higher Education Faculty
and Administrators

3
(6.7%)

2

1

3

-

-

-

Media

3
(6.7%)

2

1

3

-

-

-

Government

3
(6.7%)

1

2

1

2

-

-

Labor

2
(4.4%)

2

-

1

1

-

-

Total

45
(100%)

26
(57.8%)

19
42.2%)

30
(66.7%)

13
28.9%)

1
(2.2%)

1
(2.2%)

Sector

